Part of V2 launch site Hellendoorn (WWII)5

update 7-10-13 http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/SS-Werfer-Abteilung_500

Thema WO2

#12. zaterdag 25 juni 2011 - bergen rondom Ommen en duinen aan zee - laatste hoofdstuk

#11. vrijdag 24 juni 2011 - V1 en V2 rondom Ommen

#08. zaterdag 28 mei 2011 - Boeken en overige bronnen rondom het Englandspiel en Stegeren

#02. donderdag 3 maart 2011 - Englandspiel - Stegeren

#01. zaterdag 26 februari 2011 - Ons Verwonderen Rondom Ommen - eerste hoofdstuk

Onderaan hoofdstuk #01 Ons Verwonderen Rondom Ommen staat een

lijst van alle weblogs onder het motto OnsVerwonderenRondomOmmen

en van relevante Bijdragen op het forum van OudOmmen.nl onder

Zoekplaatjes op http://www.oudommen.nl/?cat=119 en

Op zoek naar… op http://www.oudommen.nl/?cat=117 .

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Mysterie van de vuurkonten rondom Ommen

Bronnen en documenten:
V1 en V2 rondom Ommen (meer afbeeldingen volgen later)

V1.doc

V2 Hellendoorn.doc

V2 Heeten De Stentor 3-1-8.doc

V1 in Salland.doc - Luchtaanvallen 2e wereldoorlog in Rijssen en Holten

Iris Delwel – V1 – katapult.doc - 19-6-2011 vraag gemaild naar Saxion Next

Ons Verwonderen Rondom Ommen - Zie lijst aandachtspunten halverwege onze startpagina:

20. De V2’s die bij Archem lagen en onder meer vanaf de Eelerberg werden afgeschoten.
21. De V1-startglijbaan bij de gemeentegrens op de Haarlerberg en nabij kamp Twilhaar.

Zie recent: http://www.oudommen.nl/?p=8261 - 63 Op zoek naar … vuurkonten

Radar – Fall Gelb – SOE – Leo Marks.doc Erika, Ursula

Inmiddels is er zoveel informatie over verzameld dat we deze hebben samengevoegd op deze aparte wegblog onder bovenstaande titel. Opvallend is dat er over de V2 bijzonder veel en daarbij vergeleken over de V1 bijzonder weinig op het internet (aan afvuurlijsten) staat.

Mysterie van de vuurkonten rondom Ommen

Aan het eind van de oorlog werden vanaf meer dan 20 lanceerbanen in Overijssel en Gelderland vliegende VI-bommen, vuurkonten in het lokale dialect, gelanceerd richting Antwerpen dat destijds bevrijd was door de geallieerde legers.

Zie de katapult op http://1940-1945.bloemendaal.nl/index.php?id=15 en zie ook http://www.oudommen.nl/?p=7236 . Ik had nog nooit van de Schleuder gehoord!

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Lanceerplaats V1 Lettele Nr 519, 1944-1945

http://www.oorlogsmusea.nl/artikel/1484/Lanceerplaats-V1-Lettele.htm - Betonnen fundament van V1 lanceerplaats + waterput. Recent vrijgelegd en voorzien van bord waarop de historie van de lanceerbaan is te lezen. De tekst op het bord luidt:

Algemeen
De V1 (Vergeltungswaffe) was destijds een zeer modern wapentuig, was ruim acht meter lang en had een totale breedte inclusief de vleugels van ruim vijf meter.
Vanaf deze plek werden de vliegende bommen gelanceerd door middel van een soort katapultinstallatie. Een pneumatisch kanon bracht de V1 langs een startbaan van ruim 46 meter met een helling van 6 graden in een vliegende baan. De snelheid van het vliegen was ongeveer twee honderd vijftig kilometer per uur bij de lancering. Vanaf 13 juni 1944 zetten de Duitsers hiermee vanaf de Kanaalkust in Noord-Frankrijk de aanval op Londen in. Door de oprukkende geallieerden werden de V1’s echter al op 5 september 1944 uitgeschakeld. Hierna begon op 16 december 1944 vanuit Nederland de beschieting met V1’s op de haven van het al bevrijde Antwerpen (het Ardennenoffensief).

Vervoer en montage
De V1’s werden per trein in onderdelen op het emplacement in Deventer aangevoerd, vervolgens overgeladen op vrachtwagens waarna ze s`nachts over door bomen goed gecamoufleerde wegen, zoals Holterweg, Bathmenseweg en Oerdijk naar de basis gebracht werden. Vanaf deze plek gezien stonden aan de overkant van de Oerdijk, waar nu de Soestwetering stroomt, enige houten keten waarin en waarbij de onderdelen gemonteerd werden. Hierna werden de V1’s via een rail (smalspoor) met mankracht naar de lanceerplaats geschoven.

Lancering
Vanaf deze plek werden in de periode van 16 december 1944 tot 29 maart 1945 ongeveer 400 V1`s afgeschoten. Op Witte Donderdag 29 maart 1945, s’avonds om 21.30 uur, elf dagen voor de bevrijding (maandag 9 april) van Lettele en Okkenbroek, hebben de Duitsers de baan opgeblazen; wie het verwrongen staal heeft opgeruimd is onbekend. De tien gezinnen die op bevel van de Duitse bezetter op zondagmorgen 5 november 1944, binnen 8 uur, hun boerderij of woonstee moesten verlaten konden hun min of meer gehavende eigendom weer betrekken. Toen pas werd duidelijk wat er in de vluchtrichting van de V1 in de nabije bossen was gebeurd.

Gevolgen
In het Oostermaet zijn, nu nog zichtbaar, talrijke kraters van V1’s die kort na de start neerstortten en ontploften, ook een nieuw zomerhuis aan de Bathmenseweg en een boerderij aan de Cröddendijk waren getroffen en totaal vernield.

Herdenking
Te Lettele nabij de kruising Oerdijk – Bathmenseweg bevindt zich het monument ter herdenking aan de bezetting periode. Het monument is opgebouwd uit resten fundatie van de voormalige V1 baan. De gebruikte blokken zijn destijds tijdens bosbouw werkzaamheden vrijgekomen.

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Eerst even een uitstapje naar Zuid-Holland (ook over de verwarring rond de V1 en V2)
Afschietplaatsen Vogelenzang - http://1940-1945.bloemendaal.nl/index.php?id=60 –

Volgens Gerrit J. Zwanenburg, schrijver van het boek: 'En nooit was het Stil", werden de meeste nieuwe V-1's in Noord- en Zuid-Holland afgeschoten vanuit het gebied Rotterdam-Delft-Vlaardingen. Daarnaast hadden de Duitsers voor de V-2's verschillende afschietplaatsen in Den Haag, Scheveningen en Wassenaar. De laatste V-2 werd vanuit Den Haag gelanceerd op 27 maart 1945. De laatste V-1 in de richiting van London werd afgeschoten op 29 maart 1945 vanuit Vlaardingen. Een dag later werd met het codewoord "Lutzow" het sein gegeven om alle V-activiteiten in Nederland te stoppen.

Voor het staken van de lanceringen zijn een aantal mogelijke verklaringen. Eind maart 1945 was duidelijk geworden dat de Geallieerden niet meer van plan waren op de kust van West Europa te landen. Ook heeft een rol gespeeld dat de aanvoer van v-1 en v-2 vanuit Duitsland nar Nederland stagneerde.

Geen V-2 maar een V-1 in Vogelenzang

Behalve de verklaringen van de ooggetuigen en de opgraving zijn er nog meer redenen om aan te nemen dat er geen V-2's maar V-1's zijn afgeschoten in Vogelenzang. De redenen volgen hierna:

Waren het echte V-1's of namaak V-1's?

Met zekerheid kan gesteld worden dat het om echte V-1's gaat en niet om de namaakvariant. Daarvoor zijn de volgende aanwijzigen/bewijzen:

Wist men in Bloemendaal het verschil tussen een V-1 en V-2?

Het is de vraag of mevrouw Nierhoff het verschil tussen een V-1 en V-2 wel wist. Waarschijnlijk heeft zij bij het samensetllen van haar Oorlogskroniek wat dat betreft vertrouwd op het rapport van opperwachtmeester Geertsema. Zij heeft diens aanduiding V-2 zonder nader onderzoek overgenomen. Het is ook moeilijk meer te achterhalen of de opperwachtmeester het verschil tussen een V-1 en V-2 kende. Geertsema zag bij zijn inspectie op zaterdag 31 maart 1945 de nog aanwezige V-1 startbaan aan voor een V-2 installatie. De mogelijke verklaring daarvoor is dat hij voordien de V-1 startbaan, noch de V-2 installatie net eigen ogen had gezien. Zelfs voor een politieman waren het geheime wapens. Bovendien wisten de Duitsers hun bedrijfsgeheim goed te bewaren. Dat blijkt uit het feit dat de Duitsers vrijwel direct na de valse landing de projectielen opbliezen.

Maar de meest voor de hand liggende verklaring voor het misverstand tussen V-1 en V-2 is waaraschijnlijk het feit dat de Duitsers vanaf 20 maart 1945 de nieuwe versie van de V-1 zijn gaan afschieten. Die was langer, breder en sneller dan het eerdere type en had een groter bereik. Het was niet onlogisch om deze nieuwe versie van de V-1 aan te duiden als V-2, ware het niet dat er al een totaal ander projectiel bestond met die naam. Dat misverstand is ook recent weer bevestigd. In de heruitgave van de Oorlogskroniek, van april 2005, is op blz. 110 een foto opgenomen met als onderschrift 'Opgeblazen V-2 lanceerinstallatie op het terrein van huize De Schapenkamp aan de Bekslaan'. Afgaande op de afbeelding moet sprake zijn van de overblijfselen van een V-1 startbaan.

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Vuurkonten in Salland

http://www.saxionnext.nl/opleidingen/archeologie/actueel/project_vuurkonten/272

Archeologie studenten van Saxion Next doen onderzoek naar resten uit de Tweede Wereldoorlog - Bron: Iris Delwel – V1 – katapult.doc - 19-6-2011 vraag naar Saxion Next

De archeologie van de Tweede Wereldoorlog staat de laatste tijd volop in de belangstelling. Ook de opleiding Hbo Archeologie richt zich op deze zwarte bladzijde in de geschiedenis. Onder de studenten bestaat veel belangstelling voor deze periode en een aantal kiest dit thema als afstudeeronderwerp. Eén daarvan is Iris Delwel. Zij doet in Oost Nederland onderzoek naar resten van VI-lanceerbanen.

Aan het eind van de oorlog werden vanaf meer dan 20 lanceerbanen in Overijssel en Gelderland vliegende VI-bommen, vuurkonten in het lokale dialect, gelanceerd richting Antwerpen dat destijds bevrijd was door de geallieerde legers. Zo probeerde het Duitse leger de havens van Antwerpen te vernietigen. Deze havens vormden aan het eind van de oorlog een belangrijke logistieke schakel tijdens het Ardennen offensief.

Van de lanceerstellingen zijn op diverse locaties nog restanten aanwezig. Iris onderzoekt samen met andere studenten van de opleiding deze overgebleven resten. Het gaat vooral om betonnen onderdelen van de stellingen die worden getekend en gefotografeerd. Ook wordt bekeken in hoeverre de archeologische informatie een aanvulling vormen op de historische gegevens. Tot slot wordt onderzocht welke criteria kunnen worden gehanteerd om één of enkele banen voor te dragen voor bescherming als archeologisch monument.

Hoewel er veel is geschreven over de V1's is er slechts een beperkte hoeveelheid historische bronnen beschikbaar. Het was de op de stellingen ingekwartierde soldaten namelijk ten strengste verboden om foto's te maken of over de werkzaamheden te praten. De schaarse informatie is vooral afkomstig van de inlichtingendienst van het Nederlandse verzet. Archeologisch onderzoek kan dus een belangrijke bijdrage leveren aan de kennis over dit oorlogserfgoed.

Naast het veldwerk bestaat het onderzoek uit het interviewen van ooggetuigen. Dit levert veel aanvullende informatie over de inrichting van de stellingen. Daarom is het belangrijk om, nu er nog ooggetuigen in leven zijn, zoveel mogelijk onderzoek te doen naar dergelijke resten en daarbij de ooggetuigenverslagen te betrekken. Tijdens het onderzoek worden ook enkele Duitse ex-soldaten geïnterviewd die op de banen werkten. Ook die kunnen belangrijke aanvullende informatie leveren. De aanwezigheid van de lanceerbanen had destijds trouwens veel impact op de omgeving. Mensen die in de buurt woonden waren erg bang voor de bommen omdat die nogal eens direct na de lancering in de omgeving neerstortten. Tijdens het onderzoek is gebleken dat, tegen de verwachtingen in, de stellingen niet allemaal hetzelfde waren. Ze verschillen van elkaar in de wijze waarop ze zijn aangelegd en ingericht. Met het combineren van alle beschikbare informatie kan een completer beeld worden geschetst van deze episode uit de Tweede Wereldoorlog.

http://www.saxionnext.nl/opleidingen/archeologie/actueel/hbo_archeologie_discussieert_mee_over_toekomst_van_archeologische_arbeidsmarkt/271 -

http://www.saxionnext.nl/opleidingen/archeologie/actueel/onderzoek_naar_raketlanceerplaatsen_uit_de_tweede_wereldoorlog/193

Onderzoek naar raketlanceerplaatsen uit de Tweede Wereldoorlog - maandag 08 november 2010 - Onderzoek naar raketlanceerplaatsen uit de Tweede Wereldoorlog in Overijssel en Gelderland - Hogeschool Saxion Next doet onderzoek naar de locaties waar in de Tweede Wereldoorlog V1-raketten werden afgeschoten op de geallieerde havenstad Antwerpen.

De V1 was een raket van 8 meter lang, die van metalen rails werd gelanceerd. Deze rails waren bevestigd op betonnen elementen. Rondom deze lanceerbaan waren werkplaatsen aanwezig waarin de raketten gereed werden gemaakt voor lancering en barakken waarin de manschappen werden ondergebracht. De plaatsen waren verboden toegang en werden daarom als sperrgebiet ingesteld.

Naast onderzoek naar de aanwezige resten en verstoringen wordt er archief -en historisch onderzoek uitgevoerd. Als aanvulling op deze informatie, is Saxion Next geïnteresseerd in verhalen, ooggetuigeverslagen, informatie over het gebruik van het sperrgebiet, neergestorte V1-raketten en gebruikte boerderijen in de omgeving.

Het doel van het onderzoek is om een volledig beeld te krijgen van de lanceerplaatsen. Op basis van het onderzoek zal de meest representatieve lanceerbaan voorgedragen worden voor behoud.

Uiteindelijk verschijnt er een rapport waarin alle bevindingen zijn gebundeld.

Archeologie studenten van Saxion Next* doen (of deden?) onderzoek naar “meer dan 20 lanceerbanen in Overijssel en Gelderland van vliegende VI-bommen, vuurkonten in het lokale dialect, gelanceerd richting Antwerpen dat destijds bevrijd was door de geallieerde legers.” [In het Grieks heet een vuurvliegje een vuurkontje, maar dit terzijde. -gb]

Op het forum (OudOmmen.nl) praatten we al over 3 V1-lokaties (langs de Toeristenweg tussen Nijverdal en Holten, nabij het vroegere kamp Twilhaar bij Nijverdal en bij Lettele. Maar 20 vuurkonten…. het zal ons zeer benieuwen! We hebben al nadere informatie gevraagd en komen er hier dus nog wel op terug. Kent iemand dat woord en kan iemand nog zo’n lanceerplek te velde aanwijzen? Zie foto http://www.saxionnext.nl/custom/instanties/inst_10/foto_272.jpg

De andere foto http://www.saxionnext.nl/custom/instanties/inst_10/foto_193.jpg is kennelijk genomen bij een rotonde in Holten en kennelijk omdat daar in de buurt een vuurkont was. Kent iemand die locatie? Of is hier wellicht toch de plek bij het horizontale deel van de Toeristenweg bedoeld?

PS: De termen raket voor de V2 en vliegende bom voor de V1 worden hier en daar soms wat verhaspeld. Een V1 vloog horizontaal, werd gelanceerd vanaf een glijbaan die aan het eind een beetje omhoog stond zoals op een vliegdekschip en -heel bijzonder; we kunnen het nauwelijks geloven- naar verluidt met behulp van een grote verticale stalen katapult***.

In de buurt van zijn berekende doel werd de motor stopgezet en stortte hij ter aarde; nauwkeurigheid was geen punt. Wij hebben van zo’n katapult slechts 1 bron gevonden en verder wordt ‘ie in vele stukken gewoon niet genoemd, terwijl het toch een zeer opvallende verschijning moet zijn geweest.

In technisch opzicht was de V1 eigenlijk een onbemand straalvliegtuig** en een voorloper van de moderne kruisraket. De V2 was een echte raket die eerst recht omhoog ging en dan in een grote boog naar zijn doel viel. De moderne Scud-raket is er een late opvolger van.

In onze regio zijn veel V2’s afgeschoten vanaf de Eelerberg, in Emmen (bij Dalfsen), Hessum en op Mataram. Zie http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/SS-Werfer-Abteilung_500 , http://www.v2rocket.com/start/deployment/hellendoorn_dalfsen.html en vooral http://www.v2rocket.com/start/deployment/timeline.html met zeer lange en gedetailleerde lijsten, die we van de V1 helaas niet hebben kunnen vinden.

Enkele gebeurtenissen uit die lijsten ter toelichting:

“- 1944 Dec. 31; Batt. SS 500 moves to new firing Sites at Hessum; Dutch resistance reported on Dec. 31 about one hundred rockets lying underneath the trees of the Haagse Bos (Den Haag) corner of Leidsestraatweg.

- 1945 On January 30 Batt. SS 500 transfers to the Estate Mataram near Emmen in Dalfsen, Leitstrahlstellung moves to Ommerschans

- 1945 February - For a period of more than a week no launches took place in Dalfsen because of the soft ground caused by thawing of the frozen ground. The roads needed to be hardened.

- 1945 On March 08, 1945, after suffering fuel supply problems and very few rockets, Batt. SS Abt. 500 moved back the the old firing Sites at Eelerberg Forest.”

* http://www.saxionnext.nl/opleidingen/archeologie/actueel/project_vuurkonten/272

** http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/V1_%28wapen%29

*** http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Katapult - In de Tweede Wereldoorlog lanceerden de Duitsers V1 'vliegende bommen' (onbemande straalvliegtuigen) met behulp van een pneumatische katapultinstallatie.

Zie ook 53 Op zoek naar … wie was in Twilhaar? op http://www.oudommen.nl/?p=7236 met de foto in reactie 2 van ondergetekende en http://1940-1945.bloemendaal.nl/index.php?id=15 : “De V-1's werden in een seconde met een snelheid van 200km.u de lucht in geschoten door een 49 meter lange stalen katapult ("sleuder"). De katapult werkte op stoom van een chemische stoomgenerator. De katapult werd in grote delen aangevoerd en op een stevige betonnen fundering ( zwart op de tekening) gemonteerd. Zo'n fundering is nog te zien bij het Huis te Warmond.”

Mysterie:

Zou die bijna 50 meter lange katapult werkelijk rechtop gestaan hebben? Of is toch de horizontale glijbaan bedoeld? Wie het weet mag het zeggen!

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Honderden foto's op het internet (volgen als het lukt)

http://www.erfgoedrijssenholten.nl/doen-en-leren/luchtaanvallen-2e-wereldoorlog

In de loop van de Tweede Wereldoorlog werd de gemeente Rijssen-Holten door de Duitse Wehrmacht betrokken bij de luchtverdedigingslinie van Groot Duitsland en speelde op deze wijze bij de oorlogshandelingen ter bevrijding van Nederland een grote rol. In de meidagen van 1940 overrompelden de Duitse troepen Nederland en met ingang van 17 mei 1940 stond de gemeente Rijssen-Holten onder een door de bezetter ingesteld bestuur. In de periode mei 1940 tot september 1944 zijn voortdurend luchtaanvallen van de geallieerden op het Ruhrgebied in Duitsland uitgevoerd evenals op het bestaande burgervliegveld ten noorden van het NS-station Rijssen dat als uitwijkvliegveld voor het militaire vliegveld Twente bij Enschede was omgebouwd. Op onregelmatige tijdstippen tot aan de zomer van 1944 vielen geallieerde escorterende jachtvliegtuigen en terugkerende bommenwerpers in de gemeenten Rijssen en Holten de spoorlijn, het radarstation en de stellingen van de luchtafweer aan.

Het zuidelijk gedeelte van de Holterberg, een voormalig oefenterrein van het Nederlandse leger, werd door de Duitse Wehrmacht verder uitgebouwd voor zowel de opleiding van infanteristen als ook voor het beproeven van zwaar militair materieel. In 1943 werd het gebied overgenomen door de Waffen-SS (2e SS-tankkorps met het 9e en 10e tankdivisie) om tankgrenadiers op te leiden en van het front terugkerende soldaten op te frissen en die vervolgens de modernste tank- en artillerietechnieken te leren In deze periode was het voor de geallieerden zeer belangrijk om het spoorwegtransport en de militaire oefeningen van de Waffen-SS rondom de Holterberg te verstoren.

Met de start van de bevrijding van Nederland door de geallieerden in september 1944 (Operatie Market Garden) verhevigden de aanvallen van de geallieerde luchtmacht op het Nederlandse spoorwegnet. Het spoorwegtransport voor de bevoorrading aan het front diende tot een minimum te worden beperkt. Vanaf de herfst van 1944 tot het voorjaar van 1945 werden bij voorkeur de lichte bommenwerpers van het type Boston en Mosquito, alsook de jachtbommenwerpers Typhoon en de jachtvliegtuigen Spitfire voor de aanvallen op de spoorwegtrajecten ingezet. Met bommen tot een kaliber van 1.000 lbs werden bruggen en belangrijke spoorweggebouwen verwoest, terwijl het treinverkeer met luchtdoelraketten van 7,5 cm kaliber tot 12,7 cm en boordkanonnen van 2 cm werd aangevallen.
De getroffen spoorlijnen in de bezette gebieden van Nederland werden echter door de Duitse pioniers tot eind maart 1945 onmiddellijk na elke geallieerde luchtaanval hersteld met als doel, zeker in het voorjaar van 1945, de bevoorrading van de troepen in de Festung Holland zeker te stellen. Dat geldt ook voor het spoorwegtraject in de gemeente Rijssen-Holten. Het kwam er voor de geallieerden dus op neer om het spoorwegtransport en de Duitse militaire oefeningen gevoelig te verstoren.[foto's volgen als het lukt]

Zie de bomtrechter linksboven op kaartje en luchtfoto aan de Oude Veerweg te Rijssen. De luchtaanvallen in de omgeving van de gemeente Rijssen-Holten verhevigden zich vanaf december 1944, toen de Duitse Wehrmacht een deel van haar lanceerprogramma’s voor de V1-kruisraketten naar de bossen in de rechthoek Enschede-Zutphen-Deventer-Almelo verplaatsten. Vanaf 7 lanceerinrichtingen werd op 16 december 1944 om 5.02 uur het vuur op Antwerpen geopend. Tot aan het einde van de avond op 24 december 1944 werden 500 V1-kruisraketten afgeschoten. In het centrum van het lanceergebied bevond zich de gemeente Rijssen-Holten. De bossen van de Holterberg ten noorden van Holten en het bos ten zuiden van Rijssen leenden zich goed als opstelplaats voor de V1-kruisraket. De NS-stations Rijssen en Holten, alsook het wegenverkeersnet waren verder uitstekend geschikt voor de bevoorrading van gedemonteerde kruisraketten en voor de bouw van lanceerinrichtingen. [Hier hoort het kaartje] Vermoedelijk werden in de jutefabriek vlak ten zuiden van het NS-station Rijssen vermoedelijk de V1-kruisraketten opgeslagen. Het tijdelijk vliegveld ten noorden van het NS-station Rijssen zorgde voor het transport van dringend benodigde specialisten en ingenieurs, alsmede voor reserveonderdelen en toebehoren. De goed gecamoufleerde stellingen in de bossen werden in het algemeen niet door de geallieerde gevechtvliegtuigen ontdekt. Daarom werden alle transportwegen die konden dienen voor de bevoorrading van de kruisraketten, de spoorlijn Deventer-Wierden en de wegen vanaf Duitsland in de gemeente Rijssen-Holten, bij goede weersomstandigheden, voortdurend door de geallieerden gecontroleerd en aangevallen. Zo werd in de namiddag van 11 maart 1945 een transportcolonne met kruisraketten en toebehoren door 50 lichte bommenwerpers aangevallen en in de morgen van 19 maart 1945 een munitietrein met een lading van 76 V1-kruisraketten vernietigd. De opmars van de geallieerden naar de Rijn zorgde ervoor dat verdere lanceerinrichtingen van V1-kruisraketten naar de streek tussen Deventer-Enschede-Almelo werden verplaatst.

Vanuit dit gebied werden tussen 1 en 30 maart 1945 in totaal 1.556 V1-kruisraketten op Anrwerpen en Luik afgeschoten. Dat was voor de geallieerden het sein om nog intensiever het onderzoeksgebied Rijssen-Holten vanuit de lucht te bestuderen en met jachtbommenwerpers dag en nacht de vermoedelijke lanceerinrichtingen aan te vallen en waarbij fragmentatie(splinter)bommen, luchtdoelraketten, machinekanonnen en ook al gedeeltelijk napalm werd ingezet. Strenge camouflage- en geheimhoudingsmaatregelen van de Waffen-SS, alsook het nachtelijk afschieten van de V1-kruisraket, verhinderde de vernietiging van de vele opstelplaatsen van de mobiele lanceerinrichtingen in het onderzoeksgebied. Een bijzonderheid in de door de Duitsers gehanteerde camouflage bestond er uit dat geen zwaar luchtdoelgeschut in het lanceergebied werd gestationeerd. Ter bescherming van de lanceerinrichtingen en de infrastructuur diende gedecentraliseerd middelzwaar en licht luchtdoelgeschut (3,7 cm en 2 cm). Bij de luchtaanvallen van de geallieerde jachtbommenwerpers werd daarom op alles geschoten wat zich op de grond maar bewoog. Een massaal en doelgericht bombardement op deze gedecentraliseerde en goed gecamoufleerde doelen is echter nooit overwogen.

Nadat de geallieerden op de rechter Rijnoever meerdere bruggenhoofden hadden ingenomen en het Duitse leger zich in het Ruhrgebied terugtrok, vielen vanaf het bruggenhoofd Emmerich op 28 maart 1945 de troepen van het 1e Canadese leger de Achterhoek binnen. Op weg naar de Noordzeekust was het Twentekanaal ten zuiden van de gemeente Rijssen-Holten een serieuze hindernis die door de Duitsers hardnekkig werd verdedigd. Bijna alle nog bestaande bruggen over het kanaal werden door de Duitsers op het laatste moment opgeblazen en de wegen en straten werden van zowel AP- als AT-mijnen voorzien. Op 30 maart 1945 om 8 uur werd de laatste V1-kruisraket afgeschoten. De V1-lanceerinrichtingen werden vervolgens gedemonteerd of opgeblazen. Het bedienend personeel van de V1-kruisraketten werd vervolgens als infanterist ingezet tegen de Canadezen. Vermoedelijk is ook op dit tijdstip de afdeling van de Waffen-SS overgeplaatst naar Duitsland, omdat in het ‘Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht’ alleen nog wordt gesproken van de 2e divisie Fallschirmjager en eenheden van het 15e leger.

Als 2e Duitse verdedigingsstelling ten noorden van het Twentekanaal diende vermoedelijk de spoorlijn Deventer-Wierden, de verkeerswegen N344 en N350, het militaire oefenterrein met zijn stellingen en de voormalige lanceerinrichtingen van de V1-kruisraketten. Het voormalige vliegveld ten noorden van het NS-station Rijssen moest voor gevechts- en transportvliegtuigen worden geruimd. In grote haast werden vermoedelijk de nog niet geloste treinwagons ongeordend uitgeladen en de munitie in de afgravingen in de buurt van de spoorlijn en het militair oefenterrein uitgestald. Waarschijnlijk betrof het hier tankmunitie voor een compagnie van het 2e SS-tankkorps.

Het nog bijna vegetatieloze jaargetijde maakte het de Duitsers mogelijk om door de aanleg van loopgraven en tankgrachten, militaire schuilplaatsen en geschutstellingen ten noorden van het Twentekanaal de geallieerde aanval op veel plaatsen te vertragen, omdat men in het open veld de tanks en de mobiele gepantserde bruggenleggers kon beschieten en vernietigen. Door de massale inzet van jachtbommenwerpers en zware artillerie konden de Duitsers uiteindelijk op de noordoever van het Twentekanaal worden verslagen. De geallieerde aanval verliep eerst ten westen van de gemeente Rijssen-Holten en vervolgens werden Rijssen en Holten op 9 april 1945 bevrijd. - Bron: Rapport Multitemporele luchtfoto uitwerking gedeelte Rijssen-Holten - Risk Managementgroup BV - Institut für Geogrphie Berlin januari 2004

http://www.zuidelijkewandelweg.nl/ingezonden/fransvanuden.htm - evacuatie naar Lemelen - Eind 1944 ben ik met honderden kinderen geëvacueerd op dekschuiten, die door paarden getrokken werden, omdat er geen brandstof was en na een week kwamen we aan in de gemeente Ommen. Daar gingen we op boerenwagens op weg naar Lemelen en daar stonden mensen van pleeggezinnen te wachten, waar we terecht kwamen. Ik kwam terecht bij een boerderij van de fam. Ramerman die een boerderij precies onder de Lemelerberg aanstond. Het was een familie, bestaande uit een oudere man, een oudere vrouw en de grote dochter Dien. Daar moest ik bij slapen in de bedstede. Ik verveelde mij daar verschrikkelijk, want in de verre omtrek was geen kind te bespeuren. Dus speelde ik op de Lemelerberg, waarin een enorme zandkuil was. Daar moest ik het mee doen. Een keer mocht ik met een fles met room schudden, want dan zou er boter uitkomen. Nou, ik heb me kapot geschud, maar geen boter. Maar goed, ik was daar zo’n maandje, toen ik op een gegeven moment mijn moeder aan zag komen lopen, ik was zo blij. Ze had van de zwarte markt een chocolade reepje meegenomen, waar ze 25 gulden voor betaald heeft in Amsterdam. Ze had 14 dagen gelopen van Amsterdam naar Lemelen, om mij op te zoeken. Dat had gevolgen voor haar en mij, want mijn moeder moest weer weg van de boer, dus dat was weer een grote teleurstelling, mijn moeder liep het landwegje weer af en ik maar zwaaien tot ik haar niet meer zag. Maar ik ben tegen de avond weggelopen bij de boerderij, om mijn moeder achterna te gaan. Hoe ik haar gevonden heb dat weet ik nu nog niet, maar ik vond haar, ze liep aan het Overijselkanaal. Mijn moeder bracht mij weer terug naar de familie Ramerman, maar die wilden mij niet meer hebben, dus ging mijn moeder met mij naar de Kerkeraad, maar die zeiden dat zij geen adres meer voor ons hadden. Mijn moeder zei toen “dan breng ik Frans wel in een katholiek gezin onder” en toen hadden ze opeens wel een ander protestants gezin voor mij, dat was de familie Stirtjan. Een burger gezin met een paar kinderen. Daar had ik het wel naar mijn zin.

V1 en V2 - Ik was daar een paar weken toen ik zeer bang werd van een enorm lawaai. Ik schreeuwde het uit. Van de Holterberg werden V1 en V2 afgevuurd en die gaven zo’n lawaai en achter die dingen kwam een grote vlam en sommigen kwamen met een grote bocht weer terug, die zich dan achter het huis in de grond boorden. Die waren mislukt.
Op een gegeven moment liep ik langs het kanaal toen ik opeens in een spervuur terecht kwam van Canadezen en Duitsers. Voor mij vielen twee mensen neer die aangeschoten waren. Ik kon de berm van het kanaal in vluchten.

http://www.holtensnieuws.nl/nieuws/algemeen/item/4955-v1-raket-ontsiert-ingang-holten?tmpl=component&print=1 - V1 raket (ont)siert ingang Holten - In Holten is steeds meer feestversiering zichtbaar ter herdenking dat het 65 jaar geleden is dat Nederland is bevrijd. Toch zullen er bij een aantal bezoekers misschien vragen bestaan over de V1 raketten in o.a. de Oranjestraat. Deze zijn gekozen om even stil te staan bij het feit dat er, o.a. vanaf de Holterberg, honderden V1 raketten tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog zijn gelanceerd. De V1 had een bereik van meer dan 220km, genoeg om vanaf Holten Engeland te bereiken. Ook ontplofte daags na de bevrijding een bom van het type V1 of V2 in Holten waarbij een meisje is omgekomen. Ook in andere plaatsen rondom Holten hebben lanceer installaties gestaan. De centrale luchtleiding welke de lancering van de V1 coördineerde bevond zich in Hertme. Of een ieder blij is de V1 op de rotonde en Oranjestraat, vooral met de Dodenherdenking en Bevrijdingsdag in aankomst, is de vraag. Wat vind jij hiervan?

[foto's volgen] http://www.holtensnieuws.nl/images/final/L2hvbWUvaG9sdGVuc24vcHVibGljX2h0bWwvaW1hZ2VzL3N0b3JpZXMvMjAxMC9hbGdlbWVlbi92MS1yYWtldC5qcGc=.jpg

Aan het einde van 1944 krijgt pastoor van de Grooteveen enkele Duitse Luitenants en een zekere kapitein Kasparek ingekwartierd. De pastorie dient dan als een soort commandopost. Vanuit de pastorie worden ook de manschappen, die de 'Neue Waffe', de V1, bedienden, gecommandeerd. Deze lanceerbasis staat in het Nijreesbos tussen Almelo en Tusveld.

http://www.oudommen.nl/?p=932#more-932 - Verder wordt in het jongste nummer melding gemaakt dat er in Archem in de nadagen van de oorlog de beruchte V-2 raketten in elkaar zijn gezet.

http://www.oudommen.nl/?p=6695 - … het oorverdovende lawaai van de v2 of v1 die afgeschoten werden van af de Holterberg.

Aanvullende reactie van Jan Fikken uit Nijverdal [samen met Alex Alferink de maker van www.werkkamptwilhaar.nl ]

- De lanceerinrichting nabij kamp Twilhaar was inderdaad een V1-installatie. Dit geldt ook voor de installatie 5 km verderop richting Holten. Deze bevond zich vlak voor de gemeentegrens met Rijssen-Holten rechts van de huidige weg. Een gedeelte van de fundamenten ligt er nog.

- Ik zag dat je ook een aantal kampen in de buurt van Ommen noemde in jouw site. Wist je dat er naast Erika, Laarbrug en Eerde nog twee kampen op Ommens grondgebied lagen nl. kamp Arriën, een werkkamp ten noorden van de Vecht waar ook joodse mannen hebben gezeten en kamp Junne, dichtbij Erika.

- Van dit laatste kamp werd lange tijd verondersteld, ook door geschiedschrijvers als Presser en de Jong, dat het ook was gebruikt als joods werkkamp. Onderzoek van ons heeft aangetoond dat dit niet het geval was.

- Het was in eerste instantie in gebruik ten behoeve van werkverschaffingsprojecten in die tijd en was bestemd voor werklozen uit met name het westen van het land, dit onder de Rijksdienst voor de Werkverruiming. De werklozen kwamen ’s maandags per trein aan. Op vrijdagavond of zaterdagmorgen vertrokken ze naar huis.

- Het kamp lag aan de Beerzerweg ongeveer 700 m voor station Junne (Bahnhof Junne) tussen de weg en de spoorlijn. Het kamp was een kale plek met barakken omgeven door prikkeldraad. Er kwamen weinig mensen langs het kamp. Voor de bewoners van Junne was het een omweg om via de Beerzerweg naar Ommen te gaan. Het kamp lag dus nogal geïsoleerd. - De meeste arbeiders kwamen uit Leerdam.

- Kamp Junne werd later door de bezetter ontruimd en ingericht als strafkamp voor delinquenten (zwarthandelaren etc.) en stond onder supervisie van Kamp Erika dat enigszins in de buurt lag. Het was een dependance van Erika. Er kwamen geen vrijwillige werklozen meer maar criminelen (in de ogen van de bezetter). Het werd bewaakt en er kwam ook een wachthuis. De bewakers waren KK’ers (Kontrol Kommando’s, Nederlanders die werkten voor de Duitsers) en kwamen van Erika.

Dit ter informatie.

Groet,

Jan Fikken

http://www.historischekringdalfsen.nl/index.php?pagina=links

http://www.v2rocket.com/start/deployment/hellendoorn_dalfsen.html

http://www.lettele.nl/~pb/algemeen.htm - Er komt geen herstel van de V1 baan in Lettele. Wel wil de gemeente meewerken aan plaatsing van een informatiebord. - In samenwerking met de middenstand en de Oranjecommissie is in overleg met de gemeente een monument opgericht ter gelegenheid van het 40 jarig bevrijdingsfeest. Dit monument is gemaakt van betonblokken van de V1 lanceerbaan tussen Lettele en Okkenbroek.[foto's volgen]

V1 rocket launch site – Oerdijk nabij de Butersdijk en de Oostermaatsdijk tussen Lettele en Okkenbroek

52 16 59.15 N 6 17 52.56 O

http://www.panoramio.com/user/1979724?comment_page=1&photo_page=3

Entering the forest Eelerberg near Hellendoorn. Shown above is the sanatorium as it appears today. North of the sanatorium were several launching sites in the Eelerberg forest. Our last visit to these areas was in April of 2002. It was from one of these sites that Cor Lulof saw, for the first time, the launching of a V2 missile (see story below). (Photos © Cor Lulof, Tracy Dungan)

About 4 kilometers north of Hellendoorn is the forest Archem. Here the V2s were readied at the field store with warheads and technical adjustments. (Photos © Rudi Velthuis)

http://www.geocaching.com/seek/cache_details.aspx?wp=GC1AME4&Submit6=Find

Lanceerplaats V1 Nr 519, 1944-1945.

Vervoer en montage
De V1’s werden per trein in onderdelen op het emplacement in Deventer aangevoerd, vervolgens overgeladen op vrachtwagens waarna ze s`nachts over door bomen goed gecamoufleerde wegen, zoals Holterweg, Bathmenseweg en Oerdijk naar de basis gebracht werden. Vanaf deze plek gezien stonden aan de overkant van de Oerdijk, waar nu de Soestwetering stroomt, enige houten keten waarin en waarbij de onderdelen gemonteerd werden. Hierna werden de V1’s via een rail (smalspoor) met mankracht naar de lanceerplaats geschoven.
Lancering
Vanaf deze plek werden in de periode van 16 december 1944 tot 29 maart 1945 ongeveer 400 V1`s afgeschoten. Op Witte Donderdag 29 maart 1945, s’avonds om 21.30 uur, elf dagen voor de bevrijding (maandag 9 april) van Lettele en Okkenbroek, hebben de Duitsers de baan opgeblazen; wie het verwrongen staal heeft opgeruimd is onbekend. De tien gezinnen die op bevel van de Duitse bezetter op zondagmorgen 5 november 1944, binnen 8 uur, hun boerderij of woonstee moesten verlaten konden hun min of meer gehavende eigendom weer betrekken. Toen pas werd duidelijk wat er in de vluchtrichting van de V1 in de nabije bossen was gebeurd.
Gevolgen
In het Oostermaet zijn, nu nog zichtbaar, talrijke kraters van V1’s die kort na de start neerstorten en ontploften, ook een nieuw zomerhuis aan de Bathmenseweg en een boerderij aan de Cröddendijk waren getroffen en totaal vernield.
!!!!! SVP NIET IN HET BOS ZOEKEN !!!!!!

http://www.oorlogsmusea.nl/artikel/1484/Lanceerplaats-V1-Lettele.htm

http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/V1.htm

The Germans created a special unit to handle the flying bombs - the 155th Flakregiment commanded by Colonel Wachtel. The V1 - officially for the Germans the FZG-76 - was also known as the 'doodle bug', 'buzz-bomb' and 'cherry stone'. It was 25 feet long and had a wing span of 16 feet. Loaded with fuel, it weighed 2 tons and it had a warhead of 2,000 lbs of explosives. The most common way of launching the V1 was by ramp. It could also be launched by a modified Heinkel III. Originally, the V1 had a maximum range of 150 miles but this was improved to 250 miles to allow for it to be launched from Holland. About 10,500 were launched at Britain from June 1944 on, 8,800 by ramp and the rest by plane. The first one was first on June 13th 1944.

http://www.zenza.se/vw - geluid V1

http://wn.com/V-1_flying_bomb_launch_site

V2 Heeten De Stentor 3-1-8.doc - http://www.destentor.nl/salland/article2398864.ece

Weer V2-restant in Heetens weiland door Benny Koerhuis

HEETEN/RAALTE - Henri Boerdam zoekt met een groep enthousiastelingen gestaag door naar resten van de Duitse V2-raket, die eind 1944 neerstortte aan de Breebroeksweg in Heeten.

Drie weken geleden werd één van de tien persluchtflessen die in zo'n raket zaten gevonden.

Die vondst is mede te danken aan een van de medewerkers van Boerdam. ,,Ronnie Besten uit Haarle peilde vorige maand met zijn dieptedetector enkele grotere metalen voorwerpen'', vertelt de Raalter verzamelaar van oorlogstuig. Op 8 december is, onder toeziend oog van Boerdam en grondeigenaar Tibben, een van de gedetecteerde plekken afgegraven door Ronnie Besten en Gerard Pijnappel. ,,Op zo'n 60 à 70 centimeter diepte kwam een cilindervormig voorwerp tevoorschijn. Ik zag meteen dat het één van de tien persluchtflessen uit de raket was. Na het schoonmaken van de fles kwam al snel een zescijferig nummer met de tekst 'Pressluft' tevoorschijn, wat mijn vermoeden bevestigde.''

Na de vondst nam Boerdam contact op met Henk Koopman uit Diepenveen. Deze deskundige op het gebied van Duitse V-wapens uit de Tweede Wereldoorlog kon hem precies vertellen waar deze persluchtflessen voor dienden. De perslucht zorgde namelijk voor voldoende druk op de tanks van de waterstofsuperoxide ('T-stoff') en kaliumpermanganaat ('Z-stoff'), waarna beide stoffen onder de juiste druk samengevoegd werden waardoor oververhitte stoom ontstond die de stoomgenerator aandreef. Die generator dreef de zuurstof- en alcoholpompen aan. Die pompten zo'n 125 liter brandstof per seconde de verbrandingskamer in, waardoor een stuwdruk van 25 ton ontstond waarmee de raket werd voortgestuwd.

De persluchtfles is het tweede voorwerp dat van de neergestorte raket is gevonden. Begin vorig jaar werd een stuk van een grafieten straalroer in het weiland gevonden. In mei volgde een proefopgraving met een mobiele kraan. Maar het bleek een oude sloot te zijn, die was gedempt met veel metaalhoudend boerderijafval. Peilen met een dieptedetector door medewerker Johan ten Have leverde na het uitgraven geen V2-restanten meer op.

Dit jaar wil Boerdam met zijn makkers verder zoeken. Daarbij wordt het onderzoeksgebied vergroot, want de brokstukken van de raket liggen verspreid over een groter gebied. De raket is waarschijnlijk in twee delen neergestort: een aandrijfgedeelte en het deel met de explosieve lading (die mogelijk al in de lucht explodeerde). ,,In eerste instantie zoeken we door met eigen detectie-apparatuur. Mocht het nodig zijn dan gaan we misschien nog een grondradar inzetten'', aldus Boerdam.

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Nog een zijstapje naar een tijdelijk krijgsgevangenenkamp bij Heeten - V2 Hellendoorn.doc

http://huc.mine.nu:10480/40-45/kamp_prins_bernard/index.htm - Er zou dan ook nooit iets bekend geworden zijn over het krijgsgevangenkamp Prins Bernhard, ware het niet, dat in het archief van de Sectie Krijgsgeschiedenis en Ceremonieel in Den haag een memorandum werd gevonden van de toenmalige kampcommandant. De enige krant die ooit iets over het kamp heeft geschreven is het Dagblad de Gelderlander. De toenmalige hoofdredacteur woonde in dezelfde straat als de kampcommandant en heeft in 1946 de feiten uit diens mond opgetekend. - Een citaat uit het betreffende artikel: " In de eerste dagen na de bevrijding zijn tallooze staaltjes van weergalooze moed en dapperheid aan den dag getreden. Een ervan is zeker dat van een aantal jongelui, die in de nog ongerepte omgeving van Heeten, onder Raalte, in het natuurrijke Salland, ten tijde dat de zwaarbespijkerde laarzen van den overweldiger nog over onze wegen knarsten, een krijgsgevangenkmap inrichtten, waar zij loslopende moffen, Oostenrijkers en Italianen gevangen hielden. De commandant van dit kamp was de jeugdige Arnhemse sergeant Jef van Rheden, die met zijn ondercommandant Jan Weenink en tal van anderen Arnhemmers in Heeten waren ondergedoken."Omtrent de motieven voor de oprichting van het kamp vertelt het artikel dat Jef van Rheden: "In Heeten en omgeving waren heel wat jongelui ondergedoken en het was erg lastig dat er steeds van die loslopende Duitschers of Italianen zonder militaire leiding langs de weg liepen. We besloten eenvoudig deze heeren in te rekenen, hetgeen zij zich, merkwaardig genoeg, best lieten welgevallen. Maar waar moesten wij ermee blijven? Het had zooiets weg van ’n bovenhuisbewoner, die plotseling van een gullem gever een olifant cadeau krijgt. Die moffel je zoo maar niet weg. Zoo ging het ons ook met die gepakte moffen en Italianen. Gelukkig was er een klein boerderijtje achter in de Bergshoek, genaamd 't Herdertje van den Ruiter, dat werd omgetooverd in een krijgsgevangenkamp." - Alle vier de initiatiefnemers voor het kamp hadden een goede reden om uit het dagelijkse leven te verdwijnen en onder te duiken. Jan Weenink en Jef van Rheden waren voormailig militairen, afkomstig uit Arnhem en hielden samen met kapitein Hulleman een dagboek bij van gedragingen van mensen die zij van verrraad verdachten. In 1942 werd bij een inval bij de kapitein deze stukken gevonden en vonden zij het verstandig uit het openbare leven te verdwijnen. Ben Strik, de jongste van de vier, werd in zijn woonplaats Apeldoorn betrapt bij het overschrijden van de Sperrzeit en daarvoor naar kamp Vught gestuurd. na zijn vrijlating dook hij onder om de Arbeitseinsatz te omzeilen. Joop Traag, de oudste van de vier, werkte op het gemeentehuis in Zevenaar waar hij door de SD verdacht werd van het distribueren van valse bonkaarten. Alle vier vonden zij een onderduikadres in Salland, waar zij samen het hart van één van de drie Sallandse Knokploegen zouden vormen, die zich voornamelijk bezighielden met het verspreiden van het regionale verzetsblad 'de Bazuinstoot'. De meesterproef als plattelandsguerrillero legden zij pas af in de nadagen van Augustus 1944, toen zij het gemeentehuis in Raalte overvielen. Dit was de basis voor het ontstaan van het krijgsgevangenkamp Prins Bernhard. –

http://www.tweede-wereldoorlog.org/kamp-prins-bernhard.html De boerderij van Jozef, een onmisbare schakel binnen het verzet werd uitgekozen. Jozef ging accoord met de plannen. Zijn boerderij lag in het dorp Heeten, onder de rook van Raalte, was negen bynder groot en lag verscholen tussen dennebossen, met een slingerend landpad als enkele toegang tot de boerderij…. Zo werd op maandag 2 September 1944 's morgens om 09.00 uur de staf geïnstalleerd en het kamp officieel geopend. 's Avonds werden reeds de eerste krijgsgevangenen binnen gebracht. Het bewakingspersoneel bestond voornamelijk uit onderduikers van de grote boerderijen die rondom het kamp lagen, de boerderijen van Berghuis, Hunneman en van Schoorlemmer.

http://www.historischekringdalfsen.nl/index.php?pagina=links

SS Werfer Abteilung 500 in Hellendoorn / Dalfsen, Holland - Rudi Velthuis - Tracy Dungan - Ed Straten - Cor Lulof - Pic.

The locals noticed odd German troop movements on the afternoon of Nov. 16, in the forest on the edge of Eelerberg (Eelermountain) in Hellendoorn. The ground was still wet from recent rains as dozens of German rocket soldiers had arrived, under the cover of night, quite unexpectedly a few days earlier. - The German SS Werfer Batterie 500 motorized convoy came across the border and drove to Nijverdal and Hellendoorn on Nov. 13. The convoy split into two sections. One detachment moved into Hellendoorn and the other moved north to the forest at Archem.

This was the "Sonderkommando" of SS Hamptsturmfuhrer Miesel “Miesel (IVA)”, comprised of about 400 soldiers with 100 vehicles belonging to the Waffen SS, specially trained for months at the Mittelwerk and also in Poland for V2 operations. The troops of the "Vermessungsbatterie" had calculated the launch coordinates according to the "triangulation" procedure. Seventeen Dutch families, all within one kilometer of the launching areas, were evacuated from their homes. These homes were then immediately occupied by the German rocket troops. A command center was set up in Hellendoorn at the local parsonage [pastorie?-gb] -

On Nov. 16, 1944 the activity around the Eelerberg forest had increased. The giant projectile, that was the center of their attention, stood approximately 14 meters tall. The rocket, which was transferred to the firing troops from the technical troops at Archem, was placed on a small iron table (the firing table) at the edge of the tall Eelerberg trees. This activity by the Germans was followed by a long silence from the forest. An armored vehicle (Feuerleitpanzer) drove up near the launching site. Then around 15.00 hours there was heard quick, heavy beats, followed by a tremendous roar and scream unlike anything ever heard near Hellendoorn. The A4 rocket rose from its perch, slowly, spewing fire and smoke. It came up several meters, then twisted back and crashed into the wet earth. The resulting explosion shattered up to 150 windows of a nearby sanatorium hospital sending splintered glass fragments raining everywhere. Dozens of medical personnel inside of the building were sent scrambling for cover.

Hellendoorn - This was the introduction of the V-weapon, the A4/V2, to the counties of Twente and Salland in Holland. The Hellendoorn area was about to become linked in history with Hitler's vengeance weapon. The almost daily sight of the "huge torpedo shaped projectiles" rising from the forest, with an even longer mass of fire coming from the tails, followed by the long twisting trails of white smoke high in the heavens (frozen lightning), became a common occurrence for the citizens of Hellendoorn. Starting Nov. 17, V2 rockets were fired two to four times a day toward Antwerp. On Nov. 26, two rockets were fired simultaneously. - It all started in September of 1944, the SS-Werfer-Abteilung 500, under command of SS-Hauptsturmführer Johannes Miesel, was transported by train from the Tuchel heather via Freieinwalde in Pommeren to Rheine near the Dutch border. In a forest near Schöppingen (near Burgsteinfurt) at the launch site code named Schandfleck (stain, disgrace), the first V2 towards Antwerp was launched on Oct. 13, but the projectile didn’t fly farther than 3 kilometers, crashing in a meadow. –
Later, on Nov. 13, the batterie started in Hellendoorn (Overijssel). Until Dec. 14, they never succeeded in launching more than (4) V2s within 24 hours, but on that date (7) V2s were launched. After that they repeatedly succeeded in launching more than 4 rockets per day. They averaged one failure for every 5-6 rockets fired, many crashing near the launch area. - The strength of this SS-Werfer-Abteilung 500 was 8 officers and about 400 crew. There were about 100 vehicles of several types available. The classification of the division was as follows: firing battery, supply battery, flak-battery, carpark and I-Staffeln for repair and recovery of the vehicles (usually called technical battery) There were also an office, a nurseroom, field-kitchen, etc. The firing battery was divided in three groups (Schiesszüge) each of 30 man and these again in a special groups for the rocketpropulsion, the electrical installations and the Feuerleitpanzer, from which the projectiles electrically were fired. The fuel cars belonged to the supply battery. –

Because the Abteilung 500 was the only SS-Abteilung of the division, they received special attention of the division commander, SS-general Kammler. Repeatedly, he wished that the SS 500 would become the Abteilung with the highest average of launches per 24 hour period. But, it seems that the extended Wehrmacht Abteilung 444, that launched toward London, had achieved the highest result. - Kammler also made sure that the SS 500 received the best in equipment and training. The troops were educated for this special job in the Freiherr von Fritsch-Kazerne in Köslin in Pommeren, that under control of the Wehrmacht was started as the main education school for the V2 crews. Here were courses for the general tactics and technical head, also special courses for the firing, the electrotroops, the vehicle troops, for the leaders of the Hochfrequenzanlagen (High frequency devices) and for the battery-troops (calculating of the launch site, Brennschluss and Leitstrahlstellung, mounting of the V2, etc.) The education was both theoretical and practical, although of course no rockets were fired.

All members of the Wehrmacht, officers and crews, also met the V2 here. Only the SS crew, meant for a special SS division, had already received a special education. A part was detached in the underground factory in Nordhausen, where the projectiles were made. In Köslin the lessons were given by civil engineers. The fact, that the SS-men on specific orders, received an extraordinary education at the rocket factory of Nordhausen, proves that Kammler wanted to give his SS-Abteilung an advantage over the other Abteilungen that all belonged to the regular army. -

The A4/V2 rockets were transported from Germany by rail and delivered to Nijverdal. Nijverdal had been used for unloading V2’s and local residents had only seen rockets passing through by road and suggested that they were unloaded west of Nijverdal on the hill. The Dutch residents at Archem reported that rockets were unloaded at a siding in the woods between Marienburg and Ommen. Two long sidings existed to the south of the main line running from Marienburg to Ommen in the woods, these sidings served as a main unloading point for rockets. –

After unloading, the vehicles usually went to the presumed launching site, but occasionally returned to a parking place in the wood for a short time before going to the launching site. Within one or two hours of the departure of the vehicles to the launching site, a rocket launch usually took place. - Rockets were not unloaded at Ommen station, although alcohol or some other liquid had at times been brought there. The Heino station appears to have been used mainly as an unloading point for fuel. –

At Eelerberg / Hellendoorn there were at least 6 - 7 firing sites, maybe a few more. Several were located in the Eelerberg forest 1.8 kilometers northwest of Hellendoorn (Feuerstellung Nr. 410) another closer to the local sanatorium, and another (reported) about 1000 meters from the sanatorium behind an old castle-like estate. The Eelerberg woods, which are entirely coniferous, were crossed by a number of roads and all of the firing sites were on or beside these roads. Some of the actual firing platforms were built on pine logs cut to equal size, trimmed and bound together with wire and some were leveled sand only. - The SS officers stayed at House Eelerberg, under the command of Kommandant Miesel while the men were housed in farm buildings near the sites.

The second firing platoon was billeted in a house very near the launch sites, and their vehicles were parked behind the house. During the launching periods, men arrived day and night and there was a constant coming and going of people carrying boards and map cases and bringing in reports. - The launches occurred regularly near Hellendoorn until a break on Dec. 30. The total rockets fired up to that point at Hellendoorn was 126, with 15 rockets crashing during or shortly after lift off. The troops returned to the Eelerberg / Hellendoorn firing sites on Mar. 08, after a short stint in the Dalfsen area to the north.

The unit returned about 07 March from Mataram and fired from 09 – 27 March. At the end of activity, the daily rate of fire reached its peak on 17 March when 11 rounds were fired, all of them aimed at the Remagen Bridgehead. - On 17 March, the firing crews stated with great elation that they had been firing against the Western Front (the Remagen bridgehead). This was a matter of common knowledge in the neighborhood and it was even said that Hitler had sent his personal congratulations to the crews for hitting and destroying the Remagen Bridge. All the evidence of three residents' diaries and the tracking by British Type 9 Mark V Radar proves conclusively that all the eleven rounds which fell in the Remagen area came from the Eelerberg / Hellendoorn sites. -
Click here to view large map of Eelerberg / Hellendoorn launch area -

Boys in the Forest - Cor Lulof was a nine year-old boy at the time of the V-Weapon activity near Hellendoorn. During these months a normal child's time would have been occupied with school, but in Holland during the occupation things were different. The Wehrmacht used Cor's school as a barracks, so kids around Hellendoorn were taught at home by their parents and had much free time on their hands. Leather was not available, so they were wearing wooden shoes. Food was rationed, in fact everything was rationed and the Wehrmacht confiscated all leather, non-ferro-metals, horses, bikes, grain, cattle, radio sets, etc. Electricity was cut off, so at night there was only candlelight. Windows had to be blinded against air attack and everybody out on the street after eight o’clock PM without a permit was shot. -

Cor's father worked for a "Wehrmacht related firm" and managed to avoid the Nazi’s who were rounding up slave laborers. By using all kinds of fake permits (Bescheinigungen) to confirm his important work for the Wehrmacht and to keep his bicycle, Cor's father was not removed from his family. Cor owned a small bicycle, too small to be confiscated, so he joined his father every weekend on a quest for food. Food was traded against wool, stolen from the Wehrmacht-related firm he worked for, wool was a precious article in those days. -

Cor's 'Uncle Bats' had a son called Henk, who was a bit older, and the two of them used to roam through the woods in the direction of the sanatorium (a pre-war fresh-air centre for tuberculosis-patients), while their fathers talked about the war and drank Ersatz-coffee and smoked home-grown tobacco. Late in ’44, between Sinterklaas (5th of December) and Christmas (25th of Dec.), Henk told Cor a confusing story about big guns and aircraft and lots of smoke and fire, seen on occasion half a kilometer to the north, and they started to cross the wooded terrain into that direction. - They did not follow the road west to the sanatorium because the intersection was guarded by German troops and there was occasional German traffic on that road. Walking through the woods, they soon heard a horn or claxon signal some distance ahead of them and seconds later heard a tremendous roar and saw a big cloud of smoke rise above the trees. The roar increased to a thundering noise, they did not only hear it, but could feel it pounding in their chests. Then from the cloud a big dark, grey-green burning thing the size of a church tower rose into the air, trailing a huge flame, on top of a pillar of gray smoke. They ran away as quickly as possible, shocked and stunned by the experience. Running all the way back to the farm, they were looking up into the sky and seeing that strange, kinky, broken contrail. Cor had seen (frozen lightning) many times from Almelo, but without knowing what it was.

Luttenburg Incident - On Dec 04, an A4 rocket was fired from Hellendoorn. Shortly after lift off, the rocket malfunctioned and plummeted to the earth about 5 kilometers southwest of Hellendoorn, near the small town of Luttenberg. Many civilians witnessed the crash and hurried to the impact site to get a look at the curious machine. Local residents had heard the noise of previous A4 rockets blasting into the heavens for many days, but had never seen the weapons up close. - Mr. A Kleine-Toereers remembers, "…It was on the afternoon of Dec. 04, 1944. I suddenly saw an incredible sight of this thing falling from the sky. I wasn’t sure exactly what it was, probably a German V2. My neighbor came over on his bicycle and we went together to see. After we had rode some distance, we could finally see the big hole in the land where the thing had fallen. I placed my bicycle near the ditch and walked some 10 meters across the field and there I looked into the deep hole. I could see a fierce flame burning. Around the rim of the hole I could see many others who had gathered to see the object. Men, women and even children were standing very close (local newspaper says that some people actually were sitting on the remains of the crashed rocket when the warhead exploded), when suddenly an enormous bang – and then we were all pushed to the ground. Perhaps I had lain there between the dead and dying for about 10 minutes and I was still dazed when I left. I could not hear anyone groaning, as they might, because I was totally deaf. I took my bicycle and was only a little on my way when I met two acquaintances. They told me that my clothes were still burning at the top. I looked down to see that my trousers were vanished altogether, I was wearing only the top portion of the trousers." -

A local nurse saw the rocket when it was launched. Her and her relatives were terrified because they never before heard anything like the V2. The nurse immediately got the feeling that there was something wrong. After the rocket came down in the meadows, nothing happened. About 15 minutes later, there was a huge explosion. The windows of the farm where the nurse was, about 800 meters away from the accident, were broken. The farmer Heuven said: "Oh, noe bint ze allemoal dood" (Oh, they are all dead now). Immediately the nurse got her first aid kit and ran outside. On the way she saw several sons of the this farmer Heuven, some other boys and her Brother-in-law. They weren’t at the accident. Luckily, they saw the thing smoking and knew that something was not right. Their upper cloths were, even still, blown away.

When the nurse saw the accident site, she felt like it was an unbelievable movie. Everywhere there were torn apart bodies. She then asked a person to go get bed sheets for the wounded. At that moment, the Germans arrived with about four German and French made ambulances. The doctors immediately started to nurse the victims. As soon as possible they were injected with anti-tetanus. The doctors asked what she was doing there and who she was. She explained that she was a nurse, which they accepted, then they all did what they could for the wounded and dying. - After talking with the German doctors, the nurse realized that they immediately left after the launch and following crash to help some wounded people if possible. Near Luttenberg, they took the wrong road and they went in the direction of the village.

Just at the moment they noticed their mistake, the explosion occurred. Then it was easy to find the place. The nurse noticed Lady Heusen who kneeled at her son who was heavily wounded. The son told the nurse to leave before the rocket would explode a second time. So far as the nurse can remember, the injured people were moved to Almelo as soon as possible. Later, the Germans asked her if she knew if any of the injured were already at home. Fortunately, she knew many local people and she knew where they lived. Doctors left the "undergrounders" alone. Even still, many of people that went underground were victims. They left the scene because they were afraid of the Germans.

With the Germans, the nurse went to all those people. The injured were helped very nicely without any hassles. There weren't asked for their papers. The Germans did their jobs like doctors. For all the other concerns they left the victims alone. The nurse said later, "You can say whatever you want to say about the Germans, but the Germans doctors really did their duty. One can be very anti-German, but what the Germans did to ease the suffering was extraordinary." - When she came home that evening to the farm of Heusen she thought about what she saw that day. She was broken and sobbing.

The next morning, she went to all addresses where she nursed victims the day before. Then she received word of those that died that night. The son of farmer Heusen, an undergrounder from Haarlem called Lobry, a cousin of the family Heusen and several others had not survived. The victims of the accident were buried several days after the accident. On December 7, the Catholics were buried in the Roman Catholic cemetery in Luttenberg. Several others were buried in the General Cemetery in Raalte. The son of the family Heusen that passed away on December 20, was buried on December 23, in the Roman Catholic cemetery. After the accident, the nurse was asked if she would like to stay in Luttenberg. After the war, she was to unveil the monument to the disaster. -

Nineteen people died at Luttenberg that afternoon when the warhead of the V2 rocket, which remained unexploded after the crash, detonated with the crowd surrounding it. After the war, a monument was erected at the crash site in memory of those who perished that day. The monument reads as below- - In Memory of the V2 disaster on 4 December 1944 - On this place lost their lives- The Luttenburg monument still stands today as a testament to the V-weapon activity in the area and the sacrifice of the Dutch civilians. (Photos © Ed Straten)-

Dalfsen Area - Hessum and The Mataram -

In late December of 1944, the SS troops pulled out of the Hellendoorn area. It seems that, V1 launching crews near Hellendoorn were protesting the fact that V2 trajectories crossed right over the V1 launching sites just southwest of Hellendoorn. The Luftwaffe crews did not want the SS launched missiles crashing down upon them. It was also felt that the many failures could be seen by Allied aircraft as large scars in the forest from above and this would reveal the firing locations. -

It appears that another reason launch operations were moved to Dalfsen (a few kilometers northwest of Hellendoorn) was the arrest of resistance militant Chiel Dethmers from Almelo on December 8th. Dethmers (19 years old) had made complete drawings of the launch sites in Hellendoorn, which the Germans captured. Chiel Dethmers later died in a concentration camp. He died on Mar. 08, 1945 in the Reyerhorst concentration camp. -

In area Dalfsen, there were V2 firing sites in woods near Hessum and also in the forest at the estate of Mataram. These were used when the batterie pulled out of the Elerberg / Hellendoorn area. Many of the local Hessum / Dalfsen families had to vacate their homes for the SS soldiers. One of these was Jaap Janssen, a local forester. Another was Willem van Leussen, whose farm was used for the placement of the Leitstrahlstellung (V2 guiding beam) for targeting. This apparatus was connected to a telegraphing antenna that was mounted in the meadows. The SS 500 Battalion used the Leitstrahl guide beam apparatus to increase the accuracy of the rockets, and in each case - when the firing units moved, so did the wireless troops associated with them. -

The firing sites at Hessum (Madrid) were close to the tiny town, which itself is situated in a forested area. A group of four firing platforms were close to each other in a coniferous wood on the right of the road from Vilsteren to Dalfsen. All four platforms were on or beside old established roads or paths, the firing points being made of cut tree trunks buried in the soil for firmness. For the launches at Hessum, the warheads were fitted to the rocket at the field store at Archem. The complete projectile was then brought by road on a long trailer (Vidalwagen) to Hessum. -

On one occasion a rocket toppled over just before taking off and a terrific tongue of flame 50 meters long shot from its tail, causing severe casualties and doing much damage. Eyewitnesses stated that on this and similar occasions when a rocket fell back on the firing site, the warhead exploded 10-20 minutes later. - The first V2 launch from Hessum occurred just after midnight on New Years Eve. About 19 of the 118 rockets fired near Dalfsen crashed nearby. On the land of local resident Von Martels zu Dankern an impact crater was made that was 30 meters wide! The launches were soon moved to the county seat of Mataram in February. -

At Mataram five firing platforms were located in the woods of the estate of Baron Von Vorst. Vehicles were parked near the site and a number of hard standings with shelter walls were built in addition to those required for the Feuerleitpanzer. One V2 crashed at the entrance to a fire control – Feuerleitpanzer) vehicle shelter and caused a large crater, and smashing the vehicle. - In Vilsteren, near Dalfsen, V2s were tranferred from the train to the Vidalwagen road transport trailers. When firings were being conducted at Mataram, the storage / field store seems to have been the old launch sites at Hessum. - Pic.

All personnel engaged in rocket activities did not live on the sites, but were billeted in nearby houses and villages. A senior NCO, or junior officer, according to Mr. Janssen, was billeted in the large house near the entrance to the park Mataram. He appeared to be in charge of the site and had a telephone line to his direct superior who lived in the village of Dalfsen. -

The units flak batteries were positioned behind the cichorei factory in Dalfsen. There were many forbidden areas for the local population. The Germans took resident's horses and wagons for the transport of gravel to firm the roads (for the rockets) just past the Poppenallee. Whenever a convoy of rockets would arrive, the residents in Dalfsen could see the camouflaged rockets in Dalfsen, the SS soldiers milling about listening to the BBC on their radios. -

Surprisingly, many local stories of the German rocket troops stay in Hellendoorn and Dalfsen include statements to the effect; that the SS soldiers were not cruel to the residents. Some tell of the Germans handing out food, glass for the shattered windows and good care of occupied houses. Some eyewitnesses believed that many of the soldiers were tired of the war - and the "strict rules" were sometimes relaxed on the Dutch for no apparent reason. -

One German soldier even spoke of returning to Dalfsen to live after the war. He did not, so he probably did not survive the war. However, other residents told of Dutchmen without proper work papers being deported to work camps and even SS soldiers "shooting on sight" anyone who ventured too close to the operational areas.

(1-4) The beautiful grounds of The Mataram are a few kilometers west of Hessum. (5, 6) Unchanged for many years, the markings on the trees remain. (6) On one tree the marks of an SS soldier read- "SS AG 16-2-45" (Feb. 16, 1945), exactly the dates SS-Abteilung-500 conducted operations in the area. (Photos © Tracy Dungan, Ed Straten, Rudi Velthuis)

The Bridge at Remagen and the V2 attacks - March 07, 1945, was a drizzly gray day, especially for the Wehrmacht troops near Remagen Germany. American troops of the U.S. First Army surprised the German garrison at the old Ludendorff railway bridge across the Rhine River and captured the bridge. The German defenders of the bridge did manage to detonate a huge charge that raised the bridge in the air but, it settled back to its foundation, seemingly intact. - Over the next ten days the Americans poured thousands of troops and supplies over the Rhine into Germany. Hitler ordered the immediate destruction of the bridge using any and all means possible. The 9th and 11th Panzer Divisions hurried to battle the American 9th Division in the bridgehead. On March 08, ten Luftwaffe aircraft (including eight Stuka dive-bombers) attacked the bridge, scoring two hits. On March 15, twenty-one German jet aircraft attacked the bridge with poor results - fifteen of the aircraft were shot down by U.S. anti-aircraft batterys. - Hitler then tried other weapons on the bridge. These included; a tremendous 17-centimeter railroad artillery gun, intreped underwater scuba men (they swam down the Rhine in an attempt to place demolitions on the piers) and also the use of the V2 rocket to strike the bridgehead area. Hitler was sure the rocket attacks would disrupt the whole bridgehead area. He envisioned 50-100 rockets over a 2-3 day period but, at this point in the war there was no way the rocket troops could muster such an effort. - On March 16, Hitler notified German General Bayerlein that he was ordering the attack of Remagen using V2 rockets - regardless of casualties to civilians. Late on the evening of March 16 - because of the accuracy problems with the new terror weapon - the Germans fighting in the bridgehead were moved back from the area about 9 miles. American commanders hushed the possibilty of a coming "V-weapon" attack on the bridgehead. - General Kammler received the order to attack Remagen and immediately issued commands to Batt. SS Abt. 500 at Hellendoorn to target the American bridgehead. The SS Abt. 500 had just moved back to the old firing sites at Hellendoorn (130 miles north of Remagen) on March 08 and was suffering fuel supply problems and very few rockets. Dispite this, the troops were able to launch eleven rockets on March 17, all impacting around Remagen, with the farthest away being 40 km. near Cologne. - One V2 fell close to the Apollinaris Church in Remagen, about 1 kilometer from the bridge. This round destroyed several buildings near the church and caused collateral damage to buildings within 1000 meters. The impact shook every structure in the city. Another V2 fell directly into the Rhine River a little less than 1 mile from the bridge.* - The closest hit landed at 09.30 hrs in the backyard of a house belonging to a farmer named Herman Joseph Lange. A dozen U.S. soldiers were billeted in this house and three of the Americans were killed instantly. The rocket impacted less than 300 yards from the bridge shaking the ground with a tremendous boom and mini-earthquake. Vanished in the explosion were 18 farm animals. At 12.20 hrs, another V2 rocket impacted the command post of the 1159 Engineer Combat Group, killing another three men an injuring thirty-one others.* - Immediately after the V2 attacks of that morning, the already weary Ludendorff Bridge fell into the Rhine River shortly after 15.00. The earth-shaking rocket attacks of that day finally weakened the bridge to the point of its collapse. In describing the force of a single four-ton V2 hitting the earth at 3000 mph, General Dornberger touted it equal to "...50 locomotives impacting the ground at 60 mph." It was a veritable earthquake encompassing the immediate area. This type of force impacting several times in the bridgehead - probably was simply too much stress for the bridge. - Late the next day, Hitler sent his congratulations to the SS Abt. 500 at Hellendoorn for the destruction of the Ludendorff Bridge. - *U.S. Army Green Book - *Ken Hetchler "Bridge at Remagen"

Ludendorff railway bridge "Then and Now" comparison photos (click to enlarge)


(1) V2 impacted near Apollinaris Church. (2) US troops capture Ludendorff Bridge eastside. (3) Anti-aircraft batteries protect bridge. (4, 5) Bridge collapsed into the Rhine River March 17, 1945. (6) West side of bridge near where V2 impacted. (7) Remains of the Remagen Bridge today.

SS-Abteilung-500 Summary - The launch operations were located near Hellendoorn until Dec. 30, 1944. In January, the SS-Abteilung-500 commenced operations at Hessum and The Mataram, near Dalfsen, before returning to Hellendoorn on Mar. 08. The last firings near Hellendoorn occurred at the end of March 1945. The exact locations of the Eelerberg, Mataram and Madrid firing sites had been reported repeatedly by partizan-organisations to allied intelligence, but no Allied attacks on those sites ever occurred. - The SS-Werfer-Abteilung 500 left Hellendoorn in three groups on March 28, 1945, because of the approaching Canadian troops. Some of these SS troops were, in the last phase of the war they were equipped with Nebel-Werfers (15 cm, Do-Werfer) and received orders to go to a Panzer Division staging area. From there they were supposed to proceed to Berlin and battle with the Russians. Arriving at the staging area they could not find the Division they were to join, but continued toward Berlin anyway. They moved at night due to the constant air attacks. The collapse of Germany caused much confusion and it is not clear if any of these SS troops actually reached Berlin. There is some indication that they had expended their ammunition for the Nebel-Werfers in battles with the Allies along the route to Berlin. - The fate of SS General Kammler is still unknown. (An exhibition in Antwerp recently reported that Kammler had himself shot by a soldier to prevent his capture - this is not confirmed)

Other Photos - (Some photos are NOT specifically from Hellendoorn / Dalfsen.)

Rare photographs of V2 vapor trails, "frozen lightning".

(1, 2) V2s were transported to firing areas via railway. (3) The technical troop secures the warhead from its transit drum. (4, 5) The V2 was impossible to see in the forest camouflage. (6) SS General Kammler.

(1) Canadians examine a platform of logs used to support the launching of V2s at firing site in Hellendoorn. (2, 3, 4) British examine the remains of a V2 in Antwerp.

(1) V2 thrust chamber in Antwerp. (2) Canadian soldier and Dutch Resistance member examine scorched trees of V2 launch location. (3, 4, 5) A4/V2 on display in Antwerp after the war. The residents finally got a look at the weapon that shook their city.

Click here to download a zipped video clip of the Hessum A4/V2 impact crater. (2.6 MB - MPG)

Click here to download a zipped video clip of the Mataram V2 operations area. (3.0 MB - MPG)

This is a link to another website with a story about the V2 in Dalfsen - The Eelerberg forest

http://www.biblioplaza.nl/overover/lokges/hellnijv/eelerber.htm - foto links het Rentmeestershuis aan de Eelerbergweg #2 -

De Eelerberg is in de Tweede Wereldoorlog lanceerplaats van de V2 geweest. Zij werden ten zuidwesten van de rent meesterswoning (nabij het sanatorium, in de buurt van het hoogste punt) gelanceerd. - Literatuur: J.N. van Laar:'De Eelerberg', bosontwikkeling en bos beheer van een landgoed op de Sallandse Heuvelrug (1993). Voor prentbriefkaarten e.d. van het gebied: zie collectie van Johan Alferink te Nijverdal.

ABWEHR III F – H.J. GISKES – De duitse contraspionnage in Nederland – Vertaald door en met een verantwoording van Mr Dr W.H. NAGEL Oud Raadsheer bij het Bijzonder Gerechtshof te Leeuwarden – Amsterdam Uitgeverij . De Bezige Bij 1949 – NASCHRIFT van de agent Lt. H.M.G. Lauwers p279-314. Major Giskes schrijft op p274: “King Kong heeft dus Arnhem niet verraden, omdat hij het niet verraden kon. “ en op p275: “Het op de 15^e September afgeluisterde Abstimmverkehr was een duidelijke aanwijzing voor een onmiddelijke luchtaanval op grote schaal. Bovendien vlogen 15 September ’s middags twee engelse verkenningsvliegtuigen urenlang boven Nijmegen en Arnhem. Dat was op zichzelf zoveel bijzonders niet. Maar wat de zaak een duidelijk accent gaf was het feit, dat deze verkenners door een geweldige jachtvliegtuigbescherming begeleid werden. Meer dan dertig ‘Marauder’ beschermden hen tegen aanvallen van duitse jagers. Ik heb mij laten vertellen dat de duitse generale staf in Nederland daaruit meende te mogen concluderen, dat de commandanten van de aanval persoonlijk deze verkenningsvlucht maakten. Naast deze waarnemingen van duitse zijde kregen de meldingen van King Kong naar alle waarschijnlijkheid aanvullende waarde.” Lauwers schrijft op p281: “Het Nordpolspiel kan gerekend worden te zijn begonnen met mijn arrestatie op Vrijdag 6 Maart 1942.” en “…mijn eerste radioverkeer met Engeland op 3 januari 1942…”, p285: “Taconis en ik waren gezamenlijk boven het Stegerveld bij Ommen afgeworpen; onze parachutes waren op dezelfde plaats begraven.” Nagel schrijft op p152: “Nadat Taconis en Lauwers in November 1941 gedropt waren…” Giskes schrijft op p153: “Operation LETTUCE. Op 28 Februari sprongen bij Holten Johan Jordaan, alias Trumpet, Gosewijn Hendrik Gerardus ras, alias Lettuce…. Operation TURNIP. Op 28 Maart 1942 sprongen eveneens bij Holten af de agent Leonardis Andringa, alias Turnip, en de telegrafist Jan Maartens, alias Swede, of Molenaar. Maartens is de man, die bij het neerkomen verongelukte…” , op p155: “Wij openden dus op de 5^e Mei met de TRUMPET-zender onze tweede radioverbinding met Londen, door een bericht over een nieuw afwerpterrein, dat wij enige kilometers ten Noorden van Holten gevonden zouden hebben.” Op p169: “Operation PARSNIP (via TRUMPET). Op 22 juni sprongen John Jacob van Rietschoten, alias PARSNIP en Johannes Jan Buizer, alias SPINACH (ook de naam van het zendplan) af bij Holten. De opdracht was een sabotagroep in Overijssel te organiseren.” P200: “In October 1943 kregen wij in Nederland de laatste door ons geadviseerde materiaaldropping. Het Nordpolspiel, dit duel in het donker, had toen sedert de eerste dropping precies twintig maanden geduurd, en bijna twee jaren waren voorbijgegaan sedert wij de eerste agentengroep EBENEZER [Lauwers-gb] op het spoor gekomen waren. Meer dan vijftig gevechtsklare, goed-geschoolde agenten van de MID-SOE heeft het ons in handen gespeeld. “ P220: “In Maart 1944 stelde ik de Abwehr III Berlijn voor aan het zinloos geworden spel een einde te maken door een afscheidsbericht.” P221: “Aan de heren Blunt, Bingham en Co. Successors, Ltd. Londen stop we hebben geconstateerd dat u sinds enige tijd tracht zonder onze hulp in Holland zaken te doen stop wij betreuren dit zoveel temeernu wij zolang tot wederzijdse tevredenheid als uw alleenvertegenwoordiger werkzaam zijn geweest stop niettemin verzekeren wij u dat wij als u van plan mocht zijn ons op het continent een bezoek te brengen, wij uw gezanten met dezelfde voorkomendheid en zorg in ontvangst zullen nemen als wij dit tot nu toe gedaan hebben stop tot dat ogenblik. … De 31^e Maart liet ik de Fu-B-Stelle de tekst bezorgen, met de opdracht dit bericht zo mogelijk over alle gespeelde lijnen, dat waren er ongeveer tien, de volgende dag naar Engeland te seinen. De datum, 1 April, vond ik daarvoor zeer geschikt… De volgende middag seinde de Fu-B-Stelle, dat Londen het bericht op vier lijnen ontvangen en bevestigd had, maar dat de andere lijnen niet meer reageerden. De actie-Nordpol was geëindigd.”

http://www.englandspiel.nl/index.html http://www.gedenkplaats-haaren.nl http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abwehr - http://intellit.muskingum.edu/wwii_folder/wwiieurope_folder/wwiieurresdutch.html Giskes, Herman J. London Calling North Pole. London: Kimber, 1953. New York: British Book Centre, 1953. [pb] New York: Bantam, 1982. Pforzheimer notes that the author headed the Abwehr's counterintelligence branch in Holland. He tells here the story of a German radio-playback and deception operation based on the capture of a Dutch officer SOE parachuted into Holland. The operation ran undetected for two years and was used to capture 54 other agents and arms and materials dropped for the Dutch Resistance. For Constantinides, Giskes' version "of the means and imagination employed to win this intelligence victory still stands as the accurate and intriguing account from the German side." - Wolters, Jo.

1. Dossier Nordpol: Het Englandspiel onder de loep [The Nordpol Case: The Englandspiel under the Microscope]. Amsterdam: Boom, 2003. Moore, I&NS 19.1, notes that "the German capture and execution of at least 42 agents dropped into the occupied Netherlands by SOE between 1941 and 1943 represents perhaps the greatest British espionage disaster, at least in human terms, of World War II.... The central thesis of this book is that the Engelandspiel was really a deception carried out by the Double Cross or Twenty Committee, designed to convince the Germans that there was a 'Plan for Holland' to organise an underground army in preparation for an invasion." - 2. "Remarks Concerning a Research Note on The Dutch Affair," Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 3 (Jun. 2006): 459-466.

The reference in the title of this article is to M.R.D. Foot, "Research Note: The Dutch Affair," Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 2 (Jun. 2005): 341-343. Wolters takes issue with Foot's (and the official) position that SOE's dropping of more than 40 agents into the lap of the German security forces in the Netherlands in 1942-1943 involved incompetence, not perfidy. Wolters argues for "a 'purposeful policy' by some British authority, other than Dutch Section SOE, bearing on the deployment of Dutch agents like 'shock troops'.... Such a policy ... was [aimed at] keeping as many German troops as possible in the West in 1942 to relieve the Russian front." –

http://www.geocities.com/Hollywood/Studio/9761/BUITENLAND.html - LONDRA CHIAMA POLO NORD (1956) - ook: LONDON CALLING NORTH POLE/THE HOUSE OF INTRIGUE – Italië – 1956 - K-94 minuten - Regie: Duilio Coletti - Met: Dawn Addams (Mary), René Deltgen (Hermann), Philippe Hersent - (Landers), Curd Jürgens (Bernes), Albert Lieven (Matt), Folco Lulli - (Kaarden/Gorilla), Dario Michaelis (John), Giacomo "Jack" Rossi-Stuart (Henry), Ludovico Ceriana, Stephen Garret, Lauro Gazzolo, Chris Hoher, - Edith Jost, Alphonse Mathis, Mary Olins, - Matteo Spinola Adriano Uriani - Scenario: Duilio Coletti, Ennio de Concini, Giuseppe Scoponi Massimo Mida, - gebaseerd op het boek London Calling North Pole van H.J. Giskes. Docudrama. - De Nazi's pakken een belangrijke Britse agent, die dagelijks berichten transporteert van Amsterdam naar Londen. De Duitsers blijven van zijn diensten gebruik maken, maar wel met door hen gekleurde teksten. Aan Britse en Nederlandse kant worden vele agenten gevangen of gedood. De Britten smokkelen een vrouwelijke agent naar Amsterdam om de situatie weer onder controle te krijgen. Producent: Duilio Coletti. Camera: Gabor Pogany. - Muziek: Nino Rota. Montage: Vittoria De Fazio Vigorelli. Art director: - Franco Lolli. Opnamen in o.a. Londen en Amsterdam. Italiaanse uitbreng: 21juni 1957.

http://www.alliedspecialforces.org/specialoperationsexecutivelibrary.htm NETHERLANDS (in English) - Probably the worst S.O.E. disaster of the War. - Inside North Pole by Peter Dourlein (Kimber 1953) - Agents horrifying account of the Abwehr radio coup in Holland of which he was one of over 60 victims (51 S.O.E. alone) A great deal of information on S.O.E. training. - London Calling North Pole by H.J. Giskes (Kimber 1953) - German officers account of Abwehr radio coup in Holland. - Saturday at MI9 by Airey Neave (Hodder & Stoughton 1953) - Short chapter on Beatrix Terwindt, actually a MI9 agent but trained by S.O.E. Unfortunately dropped straight into enemy hands, thanks to S.O.E., somehow surviving Ravensbruck and Mauthausen. (Most agents did not survive). - The German Penetration of S.O.E by Jean Overton-Fuller (Kimber 1975) - Rather fanciful & seemingly believes German sources over English ones, but very interesting. - NETHERLANDS (in Dutch) - Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog by L. de Jong (The Hague 1969) - One of the best overall accounts of the S.O.E. Englandspiel, or radio game, which took so many agents (and that frequently meant Dutchmen) lives. –

http://cypherpunks.venona.com/date/1993/12/msg00546.html I understand that the CyberAnarchists led by E.Hughes, T.C.May, and J.Gilmore are utilizing and perfecting identity-treachery techniques on the Internet and even public media deceptions. I am quite impressed with what I have seen so far-- research into brainwashing and espionage techniques will always be dear to my heart-- although your accomplishments so far pale in comparison to my own achievements. If you wish to continue in your work, and realize your full potential, you should study the glorious Nazi Reich achievements in the area, of which I am quite proud. I give them to you below as my Christmas Present to CyberAnarchists everywhere. - You will learn how over key years of the war (1942-1943) we deceived, turned, imprisoned, and liquidated key British agents attempting to establish and aid the underground in Holland, operated their stolen radios and ciphers to provide completely fabricated reports to British headquarters without suspicion and in fact under the utmost trust, and erected a complex and massive framework and fiction of dozens of imaginary spies complete with their own idiosyncratic personalities, whose exploits were reported daily, to repeatedly stab our enemy in the most sensitive areas of his back. We had a team of half a dozen radio operators who did nothing but send fake intelligence reports to Britain over the most pricelessly sensitive aspects of the war. - We foiled the enemy's attempt to destroy a key transmitter that broadcasted the orders of the German Admirality to our heralded U—Boat fleet in the Atlantic. This made their invasion at the French coast near Dieppe more difficult and allowed us to continue to terrorize the world with our dreaded killer submarines. We manipulated the trusted radio reports and the Dutch press to convince the British that their spies had died in the attempt to destroy our extremely strategic transmitter. The reality was every single British radio operator and spy sent to Holland was either languishing in our prisons, subject to pressing interrogations, or simply liquidated. (The British agents were amateurs who were poorly equipped to deal with our crushing domination, no match for my specialists like Schreieder.) - Most dangerously for the enemy we gained detailed information about British training techniques and even profiles of their internal espionage infrastructure from our treachery practiced on their newly dropped agents (which we were informed about ahead of time from the intercepted British radio commands). We occupied the enemy British brain with fake reports of the underground, and had him drop valuable supplies by plane (including munitions) to our imaginary arsenal of spies. Abwehr officer H.J.Giskes deserves his lasting place in Nazi fame and honor and in my heart for his extraordinary cunning in the North Pole operation. He even outwitted a late desperate control attempt by a seasoned veteran of the enemy to expose our network. We had Britain intelligence completely convinced we were training fifteen hundred men of the resistance and had them drop five thousand kilos of clothing, underwear, footwear, bicycle tires, tobacco, and tea for the imaginary army! - For years we infected the enemy's own eyes and ears with insidious poison, and continued the acidic burn even after he finally perceived it! We only ceased when two of the enemy broke out of our prison and exposed the entire network. Rest assured that the warden received the appropriate punishment (actually, none would really suffice for his treasonable negligence). - So, I think you will agree my dear Nazis have far surpassed your own infrastructure in sheer historical grandeur, although I admit your massive international arsenal of fake email identities is impressive in comparison. We are especially impressed with the automation, that is, the streamlined software of Mr. Hughes' to track intelligence, identities, and outsider personalities, and generate Cyberanarchist propaganda. Mr. Hughes is clearly the most professional and instrumental leader! A man after my own heart! Oh, and Blacknet! What a brilliantly subversive idea, Mr. May. Keep up the good work. The governments of the world are quivering! - Cyberanarchists, I find particularly stellar the infiltrations into the reputable mainstream news media, most notably Wired (K.Kelly) and New York Times J.Markoff). Surely J.Gilmore helped with these. You all understand well the necessities and techniques of a cover story (`privacy for the masses'), propaganda for the outside public (`the cryptographic revolution'), and brainwashing for the insiders (`lies are liberating'). - Oh, how I lament that we may have succeeded in our own time with your glorious technology, ingenuity, commitment, and loyalty. You understand well my own dictum that every sacrifice borne, every sympathizer jailed, every traitor shot is a step toward the New Millennium. I wish all CyberAnarchists success in your own Kampf. Words cannot express the joy I feel now that my ideas have been given new life in this exhilarating new world of Cyberspace. - Peace on Earth - Good Will Toward Men – het woord FUERER gevormd met streepjes –

~~~~~~ - Nazism, War, and the Holocaust: Coming Soon to the Internet Near You === London Calling North Pole: Glorious Nazi Treachery and Espionage - By Adolf Hitler - `North Pole' was without question one of the most effective German counterespionage operations of all time-- not so much because of the level at which it operated, which was not of the highest, but because of its complexity, extent, duration, and the cleverness with which it was executed. It would have been unthinkable before the days of radio. - The British Special Operations Executive (SOE), during World War II, directed intelligence and sabotage operations against Nazi-occupied Europe from London via radio links to underground groups. It frequently air-dropped into enemy territory agents, equipment and munitions, as well as the radio operators themselves who were to work with underground groups. German Military Intelligence, the so-called Abwehr, was able in Holland to capture and `turn' some of the British SOE agents who had secretly been dropped into Holland. By controlling and dictating the messages of these agents in their underground transmissions to London, the Abwehr enticed the SOE to keep dropping further agents and material, immediately apprehended on arrival. Over a period of time (1942-44) a large part of SOE's efforts to support the Dutch Underground was thus neutralized. This operation was called `North Pole' by the Germans. It was directed by H.J. Giskes, an Abwehr officer, from whose book on the subject the following excerpt is taken (London Calling North Pole). `Ebenezer' was the name the Germans gave to the captured Dutch radio operator whom they had forced to cooperate with them at the time my account begins. MID is the Dutch Military Intelligence Service, working out of London with the British SOE. Funk-Abwehr is the German name for counterespionage units engaged in the technical task of locating secret radio transmitters by direction-finding (D/F) methods. And SIP and ORPO are German police units working in conjunction with the Abwehr.

London Calling North Pole - by H.J. Giskes - Our expectation that Ebenezer would soon be sent new tasks by London was subjected to a difficult test. We had not yet had much experience at this sort of thing and the quiet interval seemed all the more ominous by reason of the fact that we had incontestable proof that the London Secret Service was carrying out operations in Holland without making use of our `good offices'. - The first of these occasions was in early April. I received a report from the _gendarmerie_ that the body of a parachutist had been found, the man having fractured his skull on landing against a stone water trough. Investigation showed that the dead man belonged to a group of agents who had dropped in the vicinity of Holten. In our efforts to clear up this mysterious affair we turned for help to the local Luftwaffe headquarters which gave out daily reports in map form containing details of all enemy air activity during the previous twenty-four hours. The information on which these maps were based was provided by air-observation posts and radar stations, which plotted the course, height, circling positions, etc. of all single aircraft flying across Holland. We were agreeably surprised by the completeness and accuracy of this information. We found, for example, that details of the operations over Hooghalen and Steenwijk on 28th February and 27th March had been fairly accurately recorded. And we were now able to confirm that the dead agent and his companions must have been dropped near Holten on 28^th March. Through the Luftwaffe headquarters in Amsterdam we arranged for closer watch to be kept so as to establish the course of single aircraft, which we described by the word `specialists', as accurately as possible. The evaluation of these daily reports, whose accuracy steadily increased, gave us a useful line on the operations which the Allied Secret Service in England had started without our knowledge. Another indication of secret enemy activity came from Funk-Abwehr and the FuB headquarters, to the effect that a new transmitter had been heard in the Utrecht area, whose radio link had been fixed by D/F as lying close to London. Intercepted traffic indicated that this was the same station as that with which Ebenezer worked. And to add to it all Heinrichs came to me in the second half of April with the news that Radio Orange was once more passing `positive' and `negative' signals. - From all this we concluded that at least one group of agents was working in Holland outside our control and that preparations for other drops had been made. All this made me very uneasy about our play-back on Ebenezer. Had London smelt a rat? - On 29th April Ebenezer received instructions to collect material which would be dropped in the previous area near Steenwijk. I was pretty sure that it would mean bombs this time instead of containers, so I took full precautions. I borrowed against the day of the drop, which was 25th April, three motorized 3.7-cm. flak guns from Huptmann Lent, the celebrated night flyer and Commandant of the airfield at Leeuwarden, which on the day of the operation were sited round the dropping area after dark. I had the red lights of the triangle fixed on posts so as not to endanger personnel, and arranged things so that they could be switched on from a point 300 yards distant under cover. The same was done for the white light. The flak battery had orders to open fire in the event of bombs being dropped, or if I should fired a red rocket. - We switched on the lights as the British aircraft made its approach at about 0100. `Tommy' flew several times across the area, but clearly missed his direction, as the lights were not being pointed at the aircraft. As he crossed the third time I went to the apex of the triangle and shone my white light at him until he turned on his correct course. I have to thank the absence of bombs for my ability to go on telling this story. - This drop was definite proof that London had not yet discovered our control of Ebenezer. I forgot, in my delight, the lamentations of the young officer in charge of the flak, who had not been able to fire, and who might never again have such a prize held in his sights at a range of two yards. - The development of `Nordpol' reached a decisive stage at the beginning - of May. All that we had achieved hitherto could only have been maintained for a short while had not luck, sheer chance, and ingenuity caused to fall into our hands all the lines by which the London Secret Service controlled MID-SOE in Holland at that time. - At the end of April London found itself compelled to join up with one another three independent groups of agents and one other isolated individual. Since Ebenezer was included in this link-up, we very soon succeeded in identifying the whole organization. - It happened in this way. In the period February-April, 1942, MID-SOE had dropped three groups of agent in Holland, each consisting of two men and a radio set. We knew nothing of these operations. Another single agent had been landed on the Dutch coast by MTB. The operations consisted of the following: - Operation Lettuce. Two agents, named Jordaan and Ras, dropped near Holten on 28th February 1942. Jordaan was radio operator and was to work in accordance with Plan Trumpet. - Operation Turnip. On 28th February 1942 Agent Andringa and his operator Maartens were dropped near Holten. The set was to be operated in accordance with Plan Turnip. Maartens had an accident and it was his body that was found near the water trough. - Operation Leek. Agent Kloos with his operator Sebes dropped on 5th April 1942. The set was to have been operated in accordance with Plan Heck, but it was rendered useless by damage during the drop. - Operation Potato. On the 19th April 1942, Agent de Haas, using the cover-name `Pijl,' landed by MTB on the Dutch coast. Pijl had no radio transmitter, but was equipped with a radio-telephony set capable of working at ranges up to five kilometres. He had been sent out from London to contact Group Ebenezer. - Since the Turnip and Heck sets could neither of them establish communication with England, these agents made contact with Group Lettuce, which was operating the Trumpet set, in order to report their mishaps to London. It was not clear whether or not London had told Lettuce to establish these contacts. A signal from Trumpet, intercepted on 24th April and subsequently deciphered, indicated that Trumped had been in contact with Agent de Haas from Operation Potato, but that the latter had been unable to get in touch with Ebenezer. London thereupon ordered Ebenezer to make contact with Trumpet by a signal passed to the radio set under our control, and the circle was complete. - A loose contact between different groups of agents had the disadvantage from our point of view that imminent arrests could be quickly reported to London, thus making it difficult to play-back a captured transmitter. But if this contact became a close one, as in the present instance where Trumpet was operating for three other groups, the danger for all of them became very great should one be discovered and liquidated by the German counterespionage. It was highly unfortunate for London that our controlled station Ebenezer had been ordered to make these contacts just at the moment when the groups which were still working at liberty had been linked up directly with one another. (I do not know all the details of how Schreieder and his section in a few days achieved the liquidation of the entire enemy MID-SOE network operating in Holland at that time.) - Without doubt lack of experience and gullibility played an important part on the other side. The agents were really amateurs, despite their training in England, and they had no opportunity to work up through practice to the standard required for their immensely difficult task. Generally speaking they could not have reached the standard of a specialist such as Schreieder. - Trumpet had fallen into our hands complete with signal plan, operating and cipher material. The operator Jordaan collapsed when he discovered the extent of the disaster. He was a well-educated young man of good family, perhaps not developed or tough enough for the most dangerous of the jobs known to secret service-- agent operating. But that wasn’t his fault! Jordaan soon developed confidence in Huntemann and myself, and took the chance which we offered him of operating his transmitter, after we had succeeded in getting him through the nervous crisis which followed his transfer to Scheveningen. On 5th May we used Trumpet to open up a second radio link with London and passed a signal proposing a new dropping area for this group which we had found a few kilometres north of Holten. The Line of communication developed smoothly, and evidently gave London no grounds for suspicion, for the dropping area was approved shortly afterward, and we accepted the first drop there about a fortnight later. - A third radio link with London was established in the following manner. The signal plan for Turnip belonging to the dead operator Maartens had been found on the person of the arrested agent Andringa. We signaled to London via Trumpet that Andringa had discovered a reliable operator who would be able to carry out Turnip's signal plan using Maarten's set, and London gave him a trial transmission so as to test the efficiency of this new recruit. The ORPO operator who took the test must have done it excellently, for the next signal from `over there' told him that he was approved. But we soon had new troubles, which worried me a lot. - About the middle of May Heinrichs reported anxiously to me that he and his men suspected Lauwers of having transmitted several additional letters at the end of his last routine period. It was in fact normal to put a series of so called dummy letters at the end of signals, and his `overseer' had consequently not immediately switched of the set. His mistrust had, however, been aroused. Heinrichs could not himself be present during every transmission by Lauwers or Jordaan, and he requested urgently that the two operators should somehow be replaced by his own men. I saw the overseer concerned at once. The man declared that he did not know exactly what extra letters Lauwers had transmitted, but that they had had no meaning. The man knew quite well that any other answer could have brought him before a court for treasonable negligence, but since nothing could be proved one way or the other we had to await London's reactions. - I brought in Huntemann to try and find out what had actually happened, as he was on very good terms with both the ORPO men and Lauwers. It emerged simply that Lauwers had made some of the ORPO men much too trusting, had `softened them up' as we put it. The routine periods had become much too comfortable, and the good treatment I had ordered for the operators, with coffee and cigarettes, had broadened into a friendship which was proving highly dangerous. While awaiting London's reaction, I did not tell Lauwers that our suspicions had been aroused. Nevertheless, although there were no clear indications of treachery, we soon afterward put an end to the operating of Lauwers and Jordaan by once more using the trick of proposing a `reserve' operator-- which was immediately approved. - We were now in a position to bring in an ORPO man onto the key in place of either operator without London suspecting anything. The instruction and employment of reserve operators drawn from the Dutch Underground must have been quite understandable to them, as it was always possible that a mishap might occur to the No. 1 operator at any time. Profiting by these events, we did not in general use agent operators any longer. After the arrest of agents sent across later on, their sets were operated from the outset by the ORPO without any turn-over period. In this procedure we ran the risk that the `handwriting' might have been recorded in London (on a steel tape or gramophone) and that a comparison might easily give rise to suspicion. By means of touch, speed of operating and other individual characteristics of a transmission technique an experienced ear can detect the difference between different operators when on the key in exactly the same way as a musical ear can detect difference between the renderings of different masters. - If the radio organization of MID-SOE had observed proper security precautions we should never have been able to introduce our own ORPO operators. But since our experience hitherto had not disclosed any special degree of watchfulness on their part we took the risk. The carelessness of the enemy is illustrated by the fact that more than fourteen different radio links were established with London for longer or shorter periods during the `Nordpol' operation, and these fourteen were operated by six ORPO men! - === - In the course of the spring we had amassed a considerable store of knowledge about the enemy's plans, his methods of operating and his radio and ciphering systems. With the help of this experience we could probably even have dealt with blind drops had any more taken place. If the enemy had discovered the truth at this time, he would have had to rebuild a difficult, costly organizational structure, employing entirely new methods. Even making allowance for the fact that MID-SOE had not the slightest suspicion of the true state of affairs, it is a fact that the decision to drop `by arrangement' was the chief reason for the catastrophe which followed. This arrangement, which was carried out rigidly and without variation for over a year, was the really dramatic feature of `Nordpol' amid the many other mistakes of omission and commission made by our enemy. - One single control group, dropped blind and unknown to us in Holland, with the sole duty of watching drops which had been arranged, could have punctured in an instant the whole gigantic bubble of Operation `Nordpol'. This unpleasant possibility was always before our eyes during the long months of the play-back, and it kept us from getting too sure of ourselves. We could never forget that each incoming or outgoing radio signal might be the last of the operation. - The decision of MID-SOE was confirmed when the period form 28th May to 29th June brought three dropping operations, for which the `reliable' groups Ebenezer and Trumpet had to provide the reception parties. The operations were: - Operation Beetroot (via Ebenezer). Agents Parlevliet and van Steen dropped near Steenwijk. Duties-- to instruct in the Eureka apparatus, guiding beacons for aircraft. Radio communications in accordance with Plan Swede. - Operation Parsnip (via Trumpet). Agents Rietschoten and Buizer dropped near Holten on 22nd June. Duties-- organization of armed resistance in Holland. Radio in accordance with Plan Marrow. - The duties prescribed for parties Beetroot and Marrow were of such importance subsequently that I will discuss them in detail. The beetroot party was welcomed on its arrival by Underground representatives who were in fact Dutch police working for the SIPO. The arrests were made after dawn, by which time the reception party had had time to find out what the duties of the group were to be. Actually this plan broke down in the case of Beetroot, but was highly successful in all the remaining cases. On subsequent occasions we often discovered important details from the enemy's side, particularly about their secret operational intentions. For example, a single operation including the numbers under instruction, their nationality, the teaching staff, standards of ability, etc. Later on our knowledge extended into an accurate picture of the inner circle of leading personalities `over there'. - === - Group Parsnip, which had been dropped on 22nd June near Holten, had a normal assignment, namely, the organization of a sabotage group in Overijssel. Parsnip was consequently played back normally by the customary process of opening up communication, agreeing on dropping points and accepting drops. It was noteworthy that the operator Buizer was, on London's orders, also supposed to transmit for Potato (De Haas), Potato having previously worked through Ebenezer. Ebenezer's burden had been lightened in this way because London considered it to be the most reliable of its links and intended soon to use it for an important special task-- the blowing up of the aerial system of the Kootwijk radio transmitter. - At the beginning of July London told Ebenezer to make a reconnaissance to see whether the aerial system could be blown up by demolition commando under Taconis. In a series of signals exact details were given of the method by which the whole system could be destroyed by means of small charges placed at special points along the mast anchors. I accordingly sent out a reconnaissance party of our people under Willy, who were to conduct themselves exactly as if they were members of the Underground, to find out in what way it would be possible, by day or night, to approach the aerial system, and how the operation could then be carried out. The precise state of affairs as reported by Willy was then signaled to London. We reported a rather small guard, and an inadequate watch over the surrounding area. The demolition of the anchors would not present much difficulty. London signaled back that Taconis must make his preparations in such away that the demolition could be carried out on the night following the receipt of the prearranged signal. - Toward the end of July we reported that Taconis and his men were ready, and were told by London to stand by, but on no account to start anything before receiving the signal. By the time this signal came I had already thought out reasons for `failure'. - Two days later Ebenezer passed the following message to London: ``Kootwijk attempt a failure. Some of our men ran into a minefield near the anchors. Explosions followed, then an engagement with the guards. Five men missing. Taconis and remainder safe, including two wounded.'' And the next day: ``Two of the five missing men returned. Three others were killed in action. Enemy has strengthened guard on Kootwijk and other stations. Have broken off all contact. No signs yet that enemy is on our track.'' London signaled back somewhat as follows: ``Much regret your failure and losses. Method of defense is new and was not foreseeable. Cease all activity for the present. Greatest watchfulness necessary for some time. Report anything unusual.'' - A fortnight later London sent Ebenezer a congratulatory message for the Kootwijk party, adding that Taconis would receive a British decoration for his leadership. The medal would be presented to him at the earliest opportunity. - The attack planned on the Kootwijk transmitter was clearly aimed at the destruction of the radio link by which the German Admirality communicated with U Boats on the Atlantic. When some days later the English made their landing attempt on the French coast near Dieppe we saw another reason why Kootwijk had been intended to be destroyed. Somewhat late in the day, the german Admirality hastened to carry into actuality the form of defense for the aerial system which we had conjured up in our imagination. By arrangement with IC of the Wehrmacht staff, Rittmeister Jansen, I had a reference to the Kootwijk affair published in the Dutch press. The article referred to criminal elements who had attempted to blow up a wireless station in Holland. The attempt had been a failure, and captured sabotage material had pointed to enemy assistance. The law- abiding population was warned once again against committing or supporting such acts. I hoped that my opponents in London would receive this report by way of neutral countries. - A description of OPeration Marrow which follows covers the decisive phase of `Nordpol' from June, 1942 until the spring of 1943. - We knew from the first conversations on the night of the drop what the tasks were which had been given in London to the leader of Marrow, Jambroes, and his operator Bukkens, in broad outline. The plans of MID- SOE, revealed by interrogation, were on a big scale which underestimated the Abwehr potential on the German side. Typical of this was the misunderstanding of the true position in Holland concerning the morale of the population. There is no doubt that the willingness of the mass of the people to participate directly or indirectly in preparations for underground warfare did not correspond with London's expectations. It was not until one to two years later that morale grew gradually more favorable toward such plans as a result of the military defeats of the Third Reich, the growing Allied superiority and repressive German actions both against the population and against the economy of the western occupied areas. - By the terms of Plan Marrow, Jambroes, who was a Dutch Reserve officer, was to establish contact with the leader of the organization OD (Ordedienst) and get them to provide men to carry out the plans of MID- SOE. Sixteen groups, each of a hundred men, were to be organized all over the country as armed sabotage and resistance nuclei. Two agents from London, a group-leader-com-instructor and a radio operator, were to take over the leadership, organization, training and arming of these groups. No doubt this plan looked fine from an armchair in London. But its fulfillment was postponed indefinitely by the fact that Jambroes never met the leaders of the OD. - It soon became clear to us that we could not play back Jambroes' task, because as we did know who were the leaders of the OD we would not be able to tell London what Jambroes had discussed with them—when Jambroes himself was all the time under arrest. So we had to put it to London that the task originally assigned to Jambroes was impracticable, and take action in accordance with what we imagined to be the true state of affairs. We now proceeded to overwhelm London with a flood of reports about signs of demoralization among the leaders of the OD. The Leadership, we said, was so penetrated by German informers that direct contact with its members as ordered by London would certainly attract the attention of Germans. When the replies from London began to show signs of uncertainty and instructed Jambroes to be careful, we started a new line. This proposed that Jambroes should make contact with individual and reliable leaders from OD area groups, so as to form the sixteen groups planned by consultation with the middle and lower OD levels. Our proposal met with some objections, but was finally recognized in a practical manner by the increasing of the support through agents and material given to Group Marrow and its supposed component organizations. - The build-up of the Marrow organization began in August, 1942. Naturally at no time were links established with OD groups or with their leaders. On the contrary, we assured London repeatedly that we were making use of more reliable and security-minded individuals. The development of the sixteen Marrow groups had soon made such apparent progress that between the end of September and November London sent across seventeen agents through our hands in Holland, most of whom were destined for Marrow groups. Five were operators with independent radio links. We had these five lines in working order by the end of November, operating in accordance with Plans Chive, Broccoli, Cucumber, Tomato, and Celery. Each of these five groups set to work and were soon able to give dropping points to London, which were approved and supplied continuously with materials. At the beginning of December we signaled a progress report of the existing state of the Marrow groups to London. According to this, about fifteen hundred men were under training, attached to eight Marrow groups. In practice, these training detachments would have urgent need of such articles as clothing, underwear, footwear, bicycle tires, tobacco and tea. We accordingly asked for a supply of all these articles, and in the middle of December we received a consignment in thirty-two containers totaling some five thousand kilos, dropped in four different areas in the course of one night. - Our information indicated that a new party of agents had completed their training at the secret schools in England about the middle of January, in preparation for action in Holland. From 18th January to 21st April 1943 seventeen more agents were dropped by MID-SOE and met by our reception parties. This time again the majority were group leaders and instructors for Marrow and other sabotage groups. One party of two men had intelligence tasks. Another two-man party was given the task of establishing a courier line from Holland via Brussels and Paris to Spain, and a single woman agent who arrived had been given intelligence duties. The newcomers included seven operators with independent radio links. - The agents supplied in the spring of 1943 fulfilled the requirements of personnel for the MID-SOE groups which had been planned in Holland. With my few assistants, I was faced with the problem of keeping London's operational maps supplied with information about the multifarious activities of nearly fifty agents, and it seemed impossible that we could keep this up for long. To meet our difficulties an attempt had to be made to get London to agree to a reduction in the number of working radio links which were now available. We accordingly proposed `for reasons of greater security' to close down some of the Marrow transmitters. These sets, we said, would form a reserve in case some of the active transmitters and their operators should be knocked out by German action. We subsequently arrived at the position where all the Marrow sets only Marrow I to Marrow V remained in operation. - Although several times between the autumn of 1942 and the summer of 1943 we had reported one of our controlled transmitters as having been knocked out by German action, we had been compelled at times to operate as many as fourteen lines simultaneously. A reduction in radio traffic was essential for the one reason alone that we had a maximum of six ORPO radio operators at our disposal for handling the entire radio traffic with London, and these men were being continually worked up to the very limits of their capacity. - This account of how agents were dropped direct into our arms has not yet described any efforts by MID-SOE to get knowledge of the true state of affairs in Holland. Though there was no lack of trying, these attempts never made allowance for the fact that a possibility did exist that the entire communication network and all the agents sent in were in German hands. The most noteworthy enemy attempt at control, which may perhaps have been one of a number we did not recognize as such, occurred at the time of Operation Parsley on 21st September 1942. There was little doubt that the agent who was dropped, a certain Jongelie, cover-name `Arie', had a control task. Shortly after his arrest Jongelie declared that in order to confirm his safe arrival he must at once signal to London: - ``The express left on time.'' By saying this he put his SIPO interrogators in a quandary, a situation which they were meeting for the first time. - I had spent the night of the Parsley operation in the dropping area, which lay a few kilometres east of Assen, and had returned to The Hague at about 0700. At nine the telephone bell roused me from my slumbers, and the head interrogator of Schreieder's section IVE informed me of what Jongelie had just said. He added that this message would apparently have to be dispatched at the first routine period at 1100. - Half an hour later I was sitting opposite Jongelie in the Binnenhof. He was a man of about forty, with a broad, leathery face, who for a long time had been chief operator for the Dutch naval headquarters in Batavia. After a short conversation it was quite clear that Jongelie had developed some Asiatic cunning during his long period of service in Indonesia. With an unnaturally immobile face, he answered my pressing questions repeatedly with the statement that he must pass the message ``The express left on time'' at 1100 or London would realize that he was in German hands. Finally I pretended to be convinced. Seemingly deep in thought, I said that we would pass his message at 1100-- and then, as I suddenly raised my eyes, a gleam of triumph appeared in his. So this was treachery! At 1100 we passed the following message: ``Accident has occurred in Operation Parsley. Arie landed heavily and is unconscious. He is safe and in good hands. Doctor diagnoses severe concussion. Further report will be made. All material safe.'' Three days later we signaled: ``Arie regained consciousness for short period yesterday. Doctor hopes for an improvement.'' And the next day the message ran: ``Arie died suddenly yesterday without regaining consciousness. We will bury him on the moor. We hope to give him a worthy memorial after victory is won.'' - I have related this case in detail as an example of how competent tough agents, who had been appropriately prepared in London, could easily have forced us into the position where a single treacherous report would have blown the gaff. All we could do in such cases was to pretend that the man was dead or that he had been arrested by the Germans. A series of such `accidents' would probably always have been less dangerous than the possibility of treachery. Shortly after the Arie incident London began to press us to send Jambroes, the head of the Marrow groups, back to London for consultation, Jambroes having to name a deputy to act for him in his absence. The request accorded with the man's earlier statements that after three months of preparatory activity in Holland he would be required back in England. A reference to the possibilities of Jambroes' journey was now never absent from our interchange of signals. At first we described him as indispensable due to unforeseen difficulties in the building up of the sixteen groups, and in due course we found new excuses, in which the difficult and lengthy journey by the insecure courier route into Spain played the principal part. - Nineteen forty-two went by in this way. At the beginning of 1943 the requests from London for a personal report became more urgent and were now broadened to include representatives from other groups. Innumerable signals passed. London began to demand information about areas in Holland where land or sea planes could be sent to pick up couriers or agents. We were unable to find suitable areas, or, alternatively, those which we did find and reported did not suit the gentlemen `over there'-- or else we would suddenly declare them `unsafe,' whenever the organization of a special flight seemed imminent. - On various occasions we reported a number of agents as having departed for France, who were expected every month to arrive, but naturally never did so. Finally we took the only course still open to us and reported Jamboes as missing [...] informing London that our investigations showed that he could not be traced subsequent to a German police raid in Rotterdam. [...] - On 18th January 1943 Group Golf was dropped into Holland. Golf’s duties were to prepare secure courier routes through Belgium and France to Spain and Switzerland. The group was well supplied with blanks for Dutch, Belgian, and French identity cards with stamps and dies for the forging of German passes of all kinds, and with francs and pesetas. We let about six weeks pass before Golf signaled to London that a reliable and secure route had been established as far as Paris. The courier for the Golf groups would be an experienced man with cover name `Arnaud.' In actual fact Arnaud was none other than my Unteroffizier Arno, who had effected an excellent penetration of the enemy courier routes by posing as a refugee Frenchman who made his living by smuggling jewels. We proposed to London that we should dispatch to Spain via the Arnaud route two English flying officers who were living underground in Holland in order to test the reliability of this `escape line.' Our proposal was approved, and London confirmed three weeks later that the men had arrived safely in Spain. - Through this exploit, the Golf group and Arnaud acquired much credit in London, and in the spring and summer of 1943 London gave us details of three active stations of the British Secret Service in Paris which were orking on escape routes. These were run partly by French and partly by English personnel and had their own radio links with London. Obviously we did not permit the German counterespionage in Paris to take action against these stations, once more adhering to the principle that intelligence is more valuable than elimination. My section under Major Wieskotter now had a clear view of the inner working of these important escape lines, made possible by the well-sponsored arrival of Arnaud in the organization by reason of a signaled recommendation by London to the stations concerned. - The responsibility for innumerable captures of couriers and espionage material, of incoming and outgoing agents, and of espionage and radio centers in Holland and Belgium during 1943, inexplicable to the enemy Secret Services, must be laid at the door of MID-SOE's confidence in the Golf radio link, which had been in our hands since the day of its arrival in Holland. In actual fact Golf rendered certain services to the enemy in order to increase this confidence. - We had proved once again the truth of the old saying: `give and it shall be given unto you.' Numbers of Allied flying personnel who had been shot down and had gone underground in Holland and Belgium had reached Spain after an adventurous journey without ever knowing, perhaps until the present day, that they had all the time been under the wing of the German counterespionage. - === - On 31st August, Queen's Day in Holland, two `Nordpol' agents, Ubbinnk and Dourlein, broke out of the prison in Haaren and disappeared. I had a short report to this effect on the morning of 1st September from Schreieder's office. Soon afterward Schreieder himself rang up in considerable agitation to give me a seemingly endless description of the measures which he had taken for their recapture. It was clear to me that, through this incident, the bottom had been knocked out of the whole `Nordpol' operation. Even if the fugitives did not succeed in reaching Spain, Switzerland or even England itself, they were at large—though perhaps only temporarily-- and would certainly somehow record their experiences since their departure from England and get this report by some means or other back across the Channel. - === - During the first ten days of December London's signals became so dull and colorless compared with their usual quality that it did not need all our knowledge to enable us to guess that the enemy was trying to deceive us in his turn. Hardly any doubt remained that Ubbink and Dourlein had reached their objective. Nevertheless, we made no move, and gave not the slightest indication that we too realized that the great bubble of the agent network and radio links in Holland had finally been pricked. - In March, 1944, I proposed to Berlin that we should put an end to the hollow mockery of the `Nordpol' radio links by means of a final message. I was immediately told to submit a draft for approval to Abwehr Berlin, which must express confidence in victory. Huntemann and I set ourselves to compose a message which should fulfill not only Berlin's requirements but also our reflection on the two years' hoax which we had carried out so successfully. This message, the first to be transmitted quite openly in plain language, must not in any way fall short of the standard of the thousand-odd cipher signals which had been previously dispatched. We sat at my desk and exchanged our first attempts at a suitable text in order to discover something worthy of this unique occasion. Writing rather as if we were playing `consequences', each of us composing a few sentences in turn, we finally agreed on the following: - ``To Messrs. Blunt, Bingham & Co., Successors Ltd., London. We understand that you have been endeavoring for some time to do business in Holland without our assistance. We regret this the more since we have acted for so long as your sole representatives in this country, to our mutual satisfaction. Nevertheless we can assure you that, should you be thinking of paying us a visit on the Continent on any extensive scale, we shall give your emissaries the same attention as we have hitherto, and a similarly warm welcome. Hoping to see you.'' - The names given were those of the men whom we knew to be at the head of the Netherlands section of SOE. We signaled this draft to Berlin for their approval. They were evidently occupied with more important matters, however, and we had to wait a fortnight until, after one or two reminders, we received permission to transmit the message without amendment. - I passed the plain language text to the FuB station on 31st March, with instructions to pass it to England over all the lines controlled by us, which at that time numbered ten, the next day. It had occurred to me that 1st April might be particularly apposite. - The following afternoon the FuB station reported that London had accepted the message on four lines, but had not answered calls on the other six. [...] - Operation `Nordpol' was over. - The attempt of the Allied Secret Services to gain a foothold in Holland had been delayed by two years. The establishment of armed sabotage and terror organizations, which might have disorganized the rear areas of the Atlantic Wall and crippled our defenses at the critical moment of invasion, had been prevented. The penetration of the Underground movement had led to the liquidation of widely spread and boldly directed enemy espionage services. The complete deception of the enemy about the real state of affairs in Holland would have subjected him to the danger of a heavy defeat had he attempted to attack during 1942 or 1943. The information which we had gained about the activities and intentions of the enemy Secret Services had contributed directly to the countering of corresponding plans in other countries. - Operation `Nordpol' was no more than a drop in the ocean of blood and tears, of the suffering and destruction of the Second World War. It remains nonetheless a noteworthy page in the chequered and adventurous story of Secret Service, a story which is as old as humanity and as war itself. - - - To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.

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Donderdag 27-2-14 op radio NL1 een reportage over de berging van een V1 waarin het Amerikaanse verdedigingsprogramma Antwerp X V1 werd genoemd, waavan ik nog niet eerder had gehoord:

Schietgebedje: “Ach lief Vrouwkek, geef ‘m nog een douwke?”

De Amerikanen schoten ze bij Steenbergen met 40-mm uit de lucht.

http://www.skylighters.org/buzzbombs/antwerpx.html -

http://www.aviationheritage.eu/nl/content/hotel-hoofdkwartier-antwerp-x -

Bij het begin van de tweede wereldoorlog installeerden Duitse officieren zich in het hotel Grand Veneur nabij de Tremelobaan in Keerbergen, vlak bij het toenmalige vliegveld. Het hotel zou echter vooral bekend worden als hoofdkwartier van Amerikaanse troepen, het was een coördinatiecentrum tegen de V-bommen die Antwerpen bestookten. De militaire organisatie die de vliegende bommen uit de lucht moest halen werd “Antwerp X” gedoopt. De verdedigingsgordel van Antwerp X bestond zonder meer uit de toenmalige militaire “hightech”-installaties. 24 uur per dag, 154 dagen lang, hebben Amerikaanse en Britse militairen zich ingezet om het dodende Duitse Vergeltungswaffen tijdig uit de lucht te plukken. Na de oorlog bezochten heel wat hoogwaardigheidsbekleder de Grand Veneur. Op 21 maart 1945 signeerde koningin Elisabeth het gastenboek.

http://www.v2rocket.com/start/chapters/antwerp.html -

zie de kaart met honderden stippen voor de inslagen van V1 en V2

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/2008/jan_feb_2008/Jan_Feb_2008_pages_42_45.pdf - Cruise Missile Defense: Defending Antwerp against the V-1 - By Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) John A. Hamilton, IN - … campaign was Antwerp-X—the secret battle to protect the port of Antwerp from the German V-1 Buzz Bomb.

http://www.britishpathe.com/video/time-to-remember-standing-alone-1940-reel-1 -

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Cruise+missile+defense%3A+defending+Antwerp+against+the+V-1.-a0181463794 – This battle lasted from October 1944 until March 1945. It required thousands of antiaircraft troops, many guns and vehicles, and tons of ammunition and supplies. No terrain or ground was seized, and it occurred in the midst of other furious combat between the Allies and what remained of the German armed forces.

During this time, the last great German offensive, Operation Wacht am Rhein (also known as the Battle of the Bulge) occurred. Although antiaircraft units participated in a ground defensive role, it eclipsed the Antwerp-X effort. But the German V-1 attacks continued and even escalated during and after the reduction of the Ardennes salient.

As a historical example of matured air defense doctrine and tactics, Antwerp-X stands out. It is an example of the versatility of combat troops and of interbranch, inter-service and international cooperation to meet and defeat a significant threat--like the threat that exists today

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Met hartelijke groet,

Geerτ Bakker

Ons Verwonderen Rondom Ommen

Truth is a pathless land - Jiddu Krishnamurti